
THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

HUNGARIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

XXII ANNUAL MEETING

2016

PROGRAM

PÁZMÁNY PÉTER CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
17-18 June 2016, Esztergom

THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

What are the most important preconditions of a high-quality democracy? Normative and empirical research projects are dealing with this question more intensively in the international political science community since the mid-2000s but the Hungarian political science has neglected this research trend in spite of its direct interest in assessing the quality of democracy. One can find only a couple of theoretical reflections in the Hungarian political science on how to evaluate the Hungarian democracy and even less on empirical testing of its quality.

On the other hand, all kinds of political science research include a momentum of evaluation, even empirical researches are based on some evaluative term or conception. This implies that evaluation is unavoidable and inherent to all research activity though it is often an implicit assumption rather than an explicit argument. This Call for Papers of the XXII Annual Meeting of the Hungarian Political Science Association encourages scholars to map these implicit assumptions, to transform them into explicit arguments and, based on these explicit evaluative criteria, to assess the quality of the Hungarian democracy preferably in a comparative way.

Is there an institutional guarantee for the formation and endurance of a high-quality democracy? Or it depends simply on the behavioral patterns of the political elite? What kind of political leaders and political parties are required in order to have a high-quality democracy? What is demanded from the electorate and the civil society in a democracy with adjectives like pluralist or liberal? Where are the frontiers of democracy? Is there a clear demarcation line between a low-quality democracy and a political system which might not be called democracy anymore? What is the difference between a regime which seems to be democracy and a real democracy? What are the preconditions of democracy beyond the Western civilization? Which aspects of the political culture are most relevant in improving the standards of the democratic life? Which mechanisms of decision-making provide the best form of democracy and which policy alternatives strengthen the democratic performance? Is there a direct link between the quality of democracy and the economic freedom and capitalism?

These stimulating questions are seeking to encourage scholars to make reflections on the evaluative criteria which might determine the expectations for the improvement of the quality of the Hungarian democracy. At the same time political science research might not stop at formulating these criteria it should be able to assess empirically various aspects of the quality of the democracy by applying the theoretical approaches in a comparative way. Comparing the quality of the Hungarian democracy with that of other regional countries or with more developed or consolidated democracies is highly preferred but case studies might also shed light on different aspects of the Hungarian democracy.

PROGRAM

Friday, 17th June

12.00-13.00	Lunch (Szent Adalbert Center)
13.00-13.15	<i>Opening ceremony</i>
13.15-13.50	<i>Kolnai Prize</i>
14.00-15.30	<i>Sessions</i>
15.30-16.00	Coffee break
16.00-17.30	<i>Sessions</i>
18.00-19.30	Keynote speech: Jørgen Møller (University Aarhus)
19.30-22.00	Dinner (Prímás Pince)

Saturday, 18th June

9.30-11.00	<i>Sessions</i>
11.00-11.30	Coffee break
11.30-13.00	<i>Sessions</i>
13.00-14.00	Lunch (Szent Adalbert Center)

Friday	12.00-13.00	12.00-13.00 <i>Lunch</i>							
	13.00-14.00	13.00-14.00 <i>Opening ceremony / Kolnai Prize</i>							
		room 205-206.	room 307	room 213	room 309	room 304	room 303	room 210	room 316
	14.00-15.30								
		Section 1	Section 2	Section 3	Section 4	Section 5	Section 6	Section 8	Section 11
		Panel 1.1.	Panel 2.1.	Panel 3.1.	Panel 4.1.	Panel 5.1.	Panel 6.1.	Panel 8.1.	Panel 11.1.
	16.00-17.30	15.30 - 16.00 <i>Kávészünet</i>							
		Section 1	Section 2	Section 3	Section 4	Section 5	Section 6	Section 8	Section 11
		Panel 1.2.	Panel 2.2.	Panel 3.2.	Panel 4.2.	Panel 5.2.	Panel 6.2.	Panel 8.2.	Panel 11.2.
18.00-19.30		Keynote speech: Jørgen Møller - Dealing with democratic diversity							
19.30-22.00	<i>Dinner (Primás Pince)</i>								
Saturday	9.30-11.00								
		Section 1	Section 2	Section 10	Section 4	Section 5	Section 7	Section 8	Section 12
		Panel 1.3.	Panel 2.3.	Panel 10.1.	Panel 4.3.	Panel 5.3.	Panel 7.1.	Panel 8.3.	Panel 12.1.
	11.30-13.00	11.00 - 11.30 <i>Coffee break</i>							
		Section 1	Section 9	Section 10	Section 4		Section 7	Section 8	Section 12
		Panel 1.4.	Panel 9.1.	Panel 10.2.	Panel 4.4.		Panel 7.2.	Panel 8.4.	Panel 12.2.
13.00-14.00	<i>Lunch</i>								

For the complete program of the HPSA Meeting including the sections in Hungarian please check this page:

<http://btk.ppke.hu/tudomanyos-kozelet/magyar-politikatudomanyi-tarsasag-2016-evi-vandorgyules/program>

KEYNOTE SPEECH

PPKE BTK, Iohanneum, 17th June 2016 6.00pm

JØRGEN MØLLER

(University Aarhus)

DEALING WITH DEMOCRATIC DIVERSITY

The massive democratization after the end of the Cold War has made the set of democracies more diverse. These differences have rekindled debates about the quality of democracy and about the causes of democratic development. In this lecture, I first review the most prominent definitions of democracy. I then use this review to map the global democratic development during the so-called third wave of democratization. Finally, I address the question of democratic sequencing, both in the contemporary era and from a longer-term historical perspective.

Jørgen Møller earned his PhD from the European University Institute with a dissertation entitled *The Post-communist Tripartition*. He has been teaching at the University Aarhus since 2008 where he became Lecturer of the year in 2009 and in 2010. He was awarded with “Meisel-Laponce Award” (best article published in the *International Political Science Review*, 2006-2010) in 2011 and with “Frank Cass Prize” (best article published in *Democratization*, 2011) in 2012. He published several books and articles at leading publishing houses and in high-quality international journals.

Books:

Post-communist Regime Change: A Comparative Study, Routledge (2009);

Requisites of Democracy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Explanation, London: Routledge (with Svend-Erik Skaaning; 2010);

Democracy and Democratization in Comparative Perspective: Conceptions, Conjunctures, Causes, and Consequences. London: Routledge (with Svend-Erik Skaaning; 2012);

The Rule of Law: Definitions, Measures, Patterns, and Causes. London: Palgrave Macmillan (with Svend-Erik Skaaning; 2014).

Articles (selection):

The Three Worlds of Post-Communism: Revisiting Deep and Proximate Explanations, *Democratization*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 298-322 (with Svend-Erik Skaaning; 2009);

Beyond the Radial Delusion: Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy and Non-Democracy, *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 261-283 (with Svend-Erik Skaaning; 2010);

Marshall Revisited: The Sequence of Citizenship Rights in the Twenty-First Century, *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 45 nr. 4, pp. 457-483 (with Svend-Erik Skaaning; 2010);

Stateness First?, *Democratization*, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 1-24 (with Svend-Erik Skaaning; 2011);

On the Limited Interchangeability of Rule of Law Measures, *European Political Science Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 371-394 (with Svend-Erik Skaaning, 2011);

When One Might Not See the Wood for the Trees: The 'Historical Turn' in Democratization Studies, Critical Junctures, and Cross-Case Comparisons, *Democratization*, Vol. 20, Nr. 4, pp. 693-715 (2013);

Regime Types and Democratic Sequencing, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 142-156 (with Svend-Erik Skaaning, 2013);

Autocracies, Democracies, and the Violation of Civil Liberties, *Democratization*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 82-106 (with Svend-Erik Skaaning, 2013);

The Medieval Roots of Democracy, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 26, Nr. 3, pp. 110-123. (2015)

SECTION 8

PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

FRIDAY, 17TH JUNE – 14.00-15.30

8.1. PANEL: ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

room 210 – Chair: Zsolt Enyedi

Bojan Todosijević (Institute of Social Sciences, Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research) – Public opinion on quality of democracy: Party preferences and electoral system evaluation in Serbia

Tibor Purger (Rutgers University) – Party Crashers: Is Political Pluralism Possible in Ethnic-Interest Representation? Developments in Serbia

Tamás Kiss (RIRNM) – Beyond the ethnic vote. Shifting determinants of the electoral behavior of the Transylvanian Hungarians

Daniel Bochsler (University of Zurich, NCCR Democracy) – Opposition from below. How local politics alters cleavage-based party systems

FRIDAY, 17TH JUNE – 16.00-17.30

8.2. PANEL: IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY

room 210 – Chair: Marek Rybář

Máté Botos (PPCU) – The future of the People’s Party strategy and the quality of democracy

Csaba Molnár and **Dániel Róna** (Corvinus University) – Has Jobbik become more moderate?

David M. Wineroither (University of Alberta) and **Gilg Seeber** (University of Innsbruck) – Two Worlds of Accountability? Party Families and Patterns of Linkage Building in Western and Eastern Europe

Vlastimil Havlík and **Peter Spáč** (Masaryk University) – Party System Dynamics, Agency, and Governance Performance as Explanation of Populist Survival: the Case of Smer-SD in Slovakia

SATURDAY, 18TH JUNE – 9.30-11.00

8.3. PANEL: PARTY POLITICS AND THE (DE)CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

room 210 – Chair: Ekaterina R. Rashkova

Tõnis Saarts (Tallinn University) – Party System Consolidation and Democracy in Estonia and Latvia: Common Background, but Divergent Outcomes

Matthijs Bogaards (CEU) – Hungary: Defective Democracy or Competitive Authoritarian Regime?

András Tóth (MTA TK PTI) – The political consequences of economic nationalism: The importance of economic nationalism to understand generic fascism

Olivera Komar (University of Montenegro) – Montenegro: a democracy without alternations

SATURDAY, 18TH JUNE – 11.30-13.00

8.4. PANEL: PARTY COMPETITION IN NEW AND OLD DEMOCRACIES

room 210 – Chair: David M. Wineroither

Fernando Casal Bertoa (University of Nottingham) and **Zsolt Enyedi** (Central European University) – Party system closure and the quality of democracy

Miriam Hänni and **Daniel Bochsler** (University of Zurich, NCCR Democracy) – Converting the crisis into political capital: voting for oppositions in established and in new democracies

Ekaterina R. Rashkova (Institute of Political Science, University of Innsbruck and NIAS EURIAS), (with **Anna Trojer** and **Florian Tusch**) – Size, Ideology or Money? What Matters for New Party Entry? Evidence from Austria

Marek Rybář (Comenius University) – Party Building, Intra-Party Competition, and EU integration in Slovakia and the Czech Republic

1. PANEL: ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR (Chair: Zsolt Enyedi)

8.1. Bojan Todosijević (Institute of Social Sciences, Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research): Public opinion on quality of democracy: Party preferences and electoral system evaluation in Serbia

Public enthusiasm or skepticism about the quality of democratic institutions may have important consequences for political legitimacy, and even prospects of democracy in a country. Evaluation of the functioning of electoral system is one important area that could breed negative sentiments about the quality of democracy. Yet, such evaluations are likely to be influenced by one's party preferences. This issue is examined using public opinion data from a post/election survey conducted in Serbia after the 2012 elections. The paper examines the distribution of attitudes about electoral systems in general, and about the way electoral system functions in Serbia in particular. Further, it examines the influence of party preferences onto system evaluations, as the electoral winners are expected to have more positive attitude towards the system in general. The results show that the public has ambivalent, and occasionally contradictory perceptions about the electoral system. It also shows that the evaluations are colored by one's party preferences.

8.1. Tibor Purger (Rutgers University): Party Crashers - Is Political Pluralism Possible in Ethnic-Interest Representation? Developments in Serbias

After 1989, ethnic minorities in post-communist countries founded their own organizations aiming for autonomous representation of interests toward the nation state. Most of them quickly evolved into political parties, among which usually one per minority, in each society, attained dominant status. Like most political parties, they gradually became less and less democratic on the inside, while pressed to achieve higher efficiency on the outside. Consequently, they lost their ability to represent the diversity of interests detectable even within an ethnic minority. Kin-state support, when exclusionary, contributes to this process. Serbia's party system appears to be different from most in that Serbian law exempts ethnic parties from the electoral threshold and enables them to enter parliament based on natural-quota results. Recent developments among Hungarian and Muslim ethnic parties in Serbia thus represent a new phenomenon that reopens the question of the possibility of political pluralism within ethnic-minorities.

8.1. Tamás Kiss (Nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet Kolozsvár): Beyond the ethnic vote. Shifting determinants of the electoral behavior of the Transylvanian Hungarians

Our study investigates empirically the determinants of electoral behavior in the context of ethnic block-voting. According to Horowitz (2000 [1985]: 326–330) ethnic block-voting is likely to appear and to persist in societies where ethnicity has become politically salient. In these situations voting could become similar to census, as electoral results depend primarily on ethnic demography. However, this account per se does not explain what the motivations of people voting for ethnic parties are (Ferree 2004; 2006; 2011). Our study focuses precisely on this issue. Our paper concentrates on the case of Transylvania's ethnic Hungarians, one of the politically activated ethnic groups of Eastern Europe. Some aspects of the ethnic mobilization of Transylvanian Hungarians are quite well documented. Csergő (2007) and Stroschein (2012) described convincingly the extensive mobilization along issues concerning ethno-national identity in the early- and mid-1990s, respectively the deliberation following it. Brubaker et al. (2006) highlighted the limits of the elite's capacities to mobilize along ethno-national issues in early 2000s. However, one could note a remarkable lack of systematic empirical studies analyzing on micro-level minority electoral behavior. Our study relies both on the classic literature of this field (Rabushka-Shepsle 1972; Bates 1974; Horowitz 2000 □1985□) and on authoritative works appeared in last one and a half decade (Chandra 2004; 2009; Ferree 2004; 2006; 2011; Posner 2005). This literature provides us different models of ethnic electoral behavior, but explores overwhelmingly examples from post-colonial societies. Our study could contribute to this body of knowledge in two ways. First, it tests different (instrumental and non-instrumental) models of ethnic voting in post-socialist context, where ethnic vote is prevalent too. Second, it tries to highlight the dynamics of electoral motivations and argues that they could change over time, even if the very phenomenon of ethnic vote seems to persist.

8.1. Daniel Bochsler (University of Zurich, NCCR Democracy): Opposition from below. How local politics alters cleavage-based party systems

According to the literature on social cleavages, political parties are formed in the national arena of politics, as different groups compete for political power in the centre. This paper brings local politics in: in regions, where minority groups are a majority (minority-majority enclaves), a cleavage-based party system would imply a political monopoly for the party of the locally dominant group. The demand for contestation of political power, and elite alternation in the local and regional arena of politics leads to the formation of rivalling parties, competing for the votes of the same segment of society. If the national political institutions prevent such a within-group plurality, then local groups or non-partisan candidates will proliferate in subnational elections in minority-majority enclaves. Empirical tests on seven ethnically heterogeneous democracies – from the United States to Moldova – show that non-partisan candidates are much more frequent in minority-majority enclaves.

2. PANEL: IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY (Chair: Marek Rybář)

8.2. Máté Botos (PPCU): The Future of People's Parties and the Quality of Democracy

Christian Democracy was one of the most important political movements of the post-1945 democracies. That ideological movement has been firstly based on religious views, then mostly characterized by social market economy and Christian social teaching. Starting in the 1970s onward, however, the original religious and moral values have been slowly replaced by the emerging people's parties reflecting the changing societal expectations which adjusted less and less space to explicit Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox religious identity. Van Kersbergen (1995) argues that the "popularization process" correlates with the process of secularization and should not be considered as a sign of loss of identity of the former Christian Democratic Parties. However, this raises the problem of the ever expanding common ground, in other words, the definition of the party as a political community. How the previously mentioned values will be articulated, how they can be formulated within a popularized community? Will this procedure complicate the functioning of the democratic institutions? Will the smaller common denominator of the community less effective and thereby shall it be considered as a weakening of confidences of the political institutions as a whole? The electoral basis determined mostly by a merely religious commitment will tend toward authoritarian alternatives or they will find their way within the people's parties? Will this represent a danger for the democratic political consensus, taking into account the change in voter preferences and the composition

8.2. Csaba Molnár and Dániel Róna (BCE): Has Jobbik become more moderate?

The study investigates the detoxification strategy of the Hungarian far-right party, Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik). First, the paper aims to ascertain to what extent Jobbik moderated its rhetoric and messages between 2012 and 2016. The study determines the degree of radicalism based on the content analysis of the Jobbik's official weekly newspaper, main demonstrations, its legislative work and the most important speeches and interviews of the party's chairman. The evaluation focuses on the language, policy themes, the substance of the proposals advanced by Jobbik and the composition of its leadership and parliamentary group. The second ambition of the paper is to examine whether the alleged moderation strategy was efficient. A successful moderation means a more broad and diverse voter base, less dispreference in the electorate towards the party. In that case it is also expected that Jobbik's moderate SMD candidates were more successful in their respective districts than their radical counterparts.

8.2. David M. Wineroither (University of Alberta) - Gilg Seeber (University of Innsbruck): Two Worlds of Accountability? Party Families and Patterns of Linkage Building in Western and Eastern Europe

Have Eastern European democracies developed political landscapes similar to those existent in their established counterparts? While most accounts of convergence are confined to the world of programmatic reasoning and policy representation, we use a unique data set to cover the wealth of instrumental and emotional modes of linkage building. Our findings support the concept of party families across linkages for the West while there is mixed evidence for postsocialist countries. Next we apply model-based cluster analysis to develop a supply-side typology of political parties. In the West, the structure of linkage building is characterized by an all-encompassing divide which separates mainstream and challenger parties. The results for affluent post-industrial societies both support and contradict premises of the cartel party hypothesis. In the East, the contrast of programmatic and clientelistic parties is most essential. In sum, patterns of accountability remained markedly different in the two regions on the eve of the economic crisis in 2008/09.

8.2. Vlastimil Havlík - Peter Spáč (Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University): Party System Dynamics, Agency, and Governance Performance as Explanation of Populist Survival: the Case of Smer-SD in Slovakia

Government participation pose a great challenge for populist political parties, usually suffering from electoral losses after joining government since the persuasive power of their anti-establishment appeal loses its credibility (De Lange 2008, Albertazzi, McDonnell 2015). On the other hand, there are several examples of successful populist survival. Perhaps the most striking case is Smer (-Social Democracy) which has become the dominant political party in Slovakia. The paper addresses the question about the reasons of the success of the party by examining the three factors that should be considered as the most important factors determining the survival of populist political parties in government. First, the context of the party system is analyzed with specific attention dedicated to appearance of niches in the electoral market and performance of the rival parties. Second, the agency of the party is examined dealing with ideological, organizational transformation and leadership of the party. Last but not least, the governance performance of the party is studied. The paper concludes that the unique combination of party system instability, credibility of transformation of the party and its performance in government are crucial not only for understanding of the recent success of Smer-SD, but also for explanation of survival of governing populist political parties in general.

3. PANEL: PARTY POLITICS AND THE (DE)CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY (Chair: Ekaterina R. Rashkova)

8.3. Tönis Saarts (Tallinn University, School of Governance, Law and Society): Party System Consolidation and Democracy in Estonia and Latvia: Common Background, but Divergent Outcomes

Two Baltic countries, Estonia and Latvia, have a very similar historical, demographic and political-institutional background (a large Russian-speaking minority, similar history, both are parliamentary systems, have PR electoral systems, etc.). However, in terms of party system institutionalization and consolidation both countries represent two extremes: on the one hand there is a relatively stable and well-institutionalized party system in Estonia (at least since the middle of 2000s) and on the other hand very volatile and fluid party system in Latvia, which has become slightly more consolidated only very recently. Moreover, the trust in key political institutions, support on democracy and satisfaction with the regime performance is also much higher in Estonia than in Latvia. Therefore two major research questions could be formulated: (1) why the party systems of these rather similar countries have evolved so differently, (2) how the party system consolidation has affected the quality of democracy? In the first section of the paper the factors, which have affected the evolution of both party systems and have contributed to their consolidation, will be explored. Here three major approaches will be tested: (1) system-based explanations (purely party system- related specific variables), (2) institutional explanations (party financing, party laws), (3) and socio-cultural explanations (political culture). In the second section of the paper it will be discussed how party system consolidation and political parties themselves have affected the quality of democracy. There would be no clear-cut answers, because the question remains whether an over-institutionalized and cartelization-prone party system in Estonia has really served democracy much better than a more dynamic and open party system in Latvia.

8.3. Matthijs Bogaards (CEU): Hungary: Defective Democracy or Competitive Authoritarian Regime?

Many observers inside and outside the country have watched with concern how Hungary's political institutions have changed after the victory of prime minister Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party in the 2010 parliamentary elections. The terms most commonly used to capture the contemporary nature of Hungary's regime are "authoritarianism" and "illiberal democracy". In contrast, this paper will analyze contemporary Hungary as a hybrid regime. Until now, the democratic grey zone has been approached from the perspective of defective democracy or electoral authoritarianism. Building on Bogaards (2009), the paper follows a novel double-root strategy, systematically applying the framework of defective democracy (Merkel et al. 2003, 2006) and of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010). This allows for two important conclusions. First, after 2010 Hungary has become a "diffusely defective" democracy, exhibiting features of all four types of defective democracy (exclusive, delegative, illiberal, and tutelary). Second, more recently Hungary risks sliding into a competitive authoritarian regime.

8.3. Andras Tóth (MTA TK PTD): The political consequences of economic nationalism: The importance of economic nationalism to understand generic fascism

The paper uses the concept of generic fascism to cover a wide range of radical and radicalized right wing populist parties. The concept of generic fascism developed by Griffin as a Weberian ideal type construction. The creation of ideal type of generic fascism helped to establish the core features of the phenomena and distinguish it from other ideal types of political rule, and to compare varieties of individual cases to the ideal type. The hope of Griffin was also to establish a basis of unity among various strands of researches investigating the phenomena of radical right (Umland, 2009). Griffin (1991) characterized generic fascism as a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism. Nonetheless, mainstream literature discussing generic fascist parties does not put economic policy of generic fascist parties into the center of the analyses. Economic policy is rather a side theme, mentioned under the heading of corporatism or third way or central economic management or part of the modernization debate (Iordachi, 2010). Economic nationalism is a “known” fact, mentioned sometimes among many other characteristics of these parties, but the main debates of the mainstream academic community rather centered on political/organizational issues of generic fascist parties. Clearly, for the mainstream political science literature, the main characteristics of generic fascism is in the realm of politics, in crafting nation as a community and not in economics. This paper proposes to include the phenomena of economic nationalism as one of the key ingredients of the concept of generic fascism. It will be argued that economic nationalism is one of the key messages of these parties, which helps to understand the causes of the popularity of these parties and also the policies they pursue after gaining power. Economic nationalism is also the key to understand the drive for gaining power for the state and the content of rejuvenation of the nation. The main thesis of the paper is that in periods following breakdown of free trade based globalization process in those countries, which have suffered somewhere in the past a major crisis in their nation formation process, there exist the possibility for the emergence of a generic fascist with program of economic nationalism centered national rejuvenation.

8.3. Olivera Komar (Faculty of Political Science, University of Montenegro): Montenegro: a democracy without alternations

Montenegro is the country in which one of the main features of representative democracy has never developed: government replaceability. After regaining independence and initiating EU accession process, externally driven changes have stimulated lively institutional transformation which, however, fails to produce meaningful democratic competition. This paper is trying to shed some light into the phenomenon: how is it possible that in formally democratic legal framework the ruling (ex-communist) party keeps winning each national election. Apart from contextual analysis it seeks to describe a rather interesting concept – image of invincibility which is together with deep national/ethnic division and non-participant political attitudes believed to be one of the key ingredients to the enigma of the last uninterrupted ex-communist incumbency in the post-communist world.

4. PANEL: PARTY COMPETITION IN NEW AND OLD DEMOCRACIES (Chair: David M. Wineroither)

8.4. Fernando Casal Bertoa (University of Nottingham) - Zsolt Enyedi (CEU): Party system closure and the quality of democracy

The paper considers party system closure as a process by which the patterns of inter-party interaction become routine, predictable and stable over time. We present data on the degree of party system closure in 65 European party systems between 1848 and 2015, relying on a recently introduced new composite index (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi, 2016). The index captures the stability in the structure of inter-party competition in the governmental arena. The presentation will contrast the degree of closure with other indicators of party system institutionalization and with various measures of the stability and quality of democracy.

8.4. Miriam Hänni and Daniel Bochsler (University of Zurich, NCCR Democracy): Converting the crisis into political capital: voting for oppositions in established and in new democracies

Economic prosperity is the best recipe for an incumbent government to be re-elected. However, in some countries opposition parties profit more in elections during the crisis than in others. Going beyond the common models of retrospective economic voting, this paper introduced a contextual factor, which moderates the degree to which citizens vote retrospectively: types of democratic legitimacy. Hypotheses are tested on a new dataset on electoral volatility in 52 democracies world-wide, over 24 years. Results suggest that citizens in young democracies tend towards a performance-based view of their regimes' legitimacy, and punish the parties in government for bad economic performance, whereas governing parties in old democracies are less affected by the crisis.

8.4. Ekaterina R. Rashkova (with Anna Trojer and Florian Tusch) (Institute of Political Science, University of Innsbruck / NIAS EURIAS Research Fellow): "Size, Ideology or Money? What Matters for New Party Entry? Evidence from Austria"

New party entry is one way in which party systems, or the number of viable political parties, can change. Often democratic countries see a long list of registered parties, many of which never attempt or never make it through elections. Consequently, the number of registered parties, the number of electoral parties, and the number of parliamentary parties varies significantly, and as a result affects the party system at hand, the government, its output and ultimately the quality of democracy in a given country. It is interesting therefore to explain why? What explains the difference between the different number of parties and what facilitates (or obstructs) parties from moving from one role to another? Here, we look at this question from two perspectives – the institutions in place, i.e. what conditions party behavior in a given system, and the party characteristics, i.e. what characterizes new party entrants in terms of size, ideology, and available funding. Presenting evidence from Austria from 1945 to present, we argue that financial ability has the highest potential at overcoming institutional barriers, often found in electoral and party regulation, in achieving a successful new entry.

8.4. Marek Rybář (Comenius University): Explaining the Recruitment of Non-Party Ministers in New Democracies: Party Building, Intra-Party Competition, and EU integration in Slovakia and the Czech Republic

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it provides an account of ministerial recruitments in two new democracies, namely in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Second, it focuses specifically on the appointment of non-party ministers in the two cases and seeks to understand conditions, both systemic and individual, that lead to the appointment of persons without party affiliation into what arguably are the most important political positions in parliamentary democracies. The paper contributes to our understanding of executive recruitment methodologically as well as theoretically. Methodologically, it specifies and expands the notion of ministerial expertise to cover both professional-managerial skills and political skills. Theoretically, it considers cases from new democracies and thus highlights factors related to the instability of party systems (which is one of key features of the political scene in the postcommunist Europe). It is argued that high levels of electoral volatility, party replacement and party turnover, remain important systemic factors behind appointments of non-party ministers. Our analysis of ministerial appointments in Slovakia and the Czech Republic shows comparatively low importance of parliamentary experience and party membership for appointments to the ministerial posts. In addition, professional-managerial skills feature prominently in ministerial profiles of cabinet members. Comparative literature stresses the importance of presidentialization of political parties for appointment of non-party ministers into the executives. The paper argues that two other factors also account for their presence in cabinets: Appointment of non-partisans is a strategic party-building tool for new parties to recruit high-profile individuals considered assets for electoral competition. In addition, accession to, and membership in the EU, helps explain why ministers without party affiliation frequently lead several “technical” portfolios.