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| Philosophy of Mind  **An Introduction**  Lecture, BBNSF04100 ERASMUS  II. Semester 2025.  **Course Description**  According to John R. Searle the general problem of the philosophy of mind can best be formulated as follows: „How do we fit in?” In Searle’s view, the framework into which we have to fit in is the physical, biological, and chemical image of the world, while the puzzling element hard to locate in this picture is the human mind. The reason is that the most salient characteristics of the mind (consciousness, intentionality, and subjectivity) resist all efforts to reduce them to physical processes. The lectures cover (1) the origin of the above problem (the so-called mind-body problem), (2) the most promising solutions proposed to it, (3) the most important contemporary theories about the nature of the mind (c) and finally some recent attempts to reformulate the question of relationship between human mind and its environment (the so-called *embodied mind* theories).  **Lecturer**: Dániel Schmal ([schmal.daniel@btk.ppke.hu](mailto:schmal.daniel@btk.ppke.hu))  **Time**: Thursday 8.15–9.45 a.m.  **Place**: D 305  **Course Requirements**: End-term oral exam  **Required** and recommended reading   * **Nagel, Thomas (2004) What Is It Like to be a Bat. *The Philosophical Review.* 83/4. 435–450** * [**Chalmers, David**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers) **(1995) Facing up to the problem of consciousness. *Journal of Consciousness Studies.* 2/3. 200–219.** * Block, Nad et alii szerk. (1997) *The Nature of Consciousness – Philosophical Debates.* Cambridge MA–London, The MIT Press. * Heil, John szerk. *Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology.* Oxford, Oxford University Press. * Blackmore, Susan (2005) *A Very Short Introduction to Consciousness.* Oxford, Oxford UP. * Block, Ned (2007) *Consciousness, Function, and Representation. Collected Papers, vol. 1.* Cambridge MA–London, The MIT Press. * Crane, Tim (2001) *Elements of Mind.* Oxford, Oxford UP. |
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