The Foreign Policy of Indonesia

In Light of President Jokowi’s “Visi-Misi” Program

Dr. Klemensits Péter
assistant research fellow

Fenyő Márton
International Studies MA

Budapest, 2015
# Table of contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 5

2. Theoretical framework of FPA .................................................................................................................. 8

3. The historical overview of Indonesia ......................................................................................................... 11
   3.1. Indonesia under colonial rule ................................................................................................................. 11
   3.2. Independence ......................................................................................................................................... 13
   3.3. The modern Indonesia .......................................................................................................................... 17

4. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo ......................................................................... 22
   4.1. Post-colonial foreign policy ..................................................................................................................... 22
   4.2. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ................................................................................................................... 25
   4.3. Joko “Jokowi” Widodo .......................................................................................................................... 29

5. Goals and challenges of the Indonesian foreign policy ............................................................................ 35
   5.1. Indonesia’s foreign policy goals ............................................................................................................... 35
      5.1.1. Committing to prioritize Indonesia’s identity as an archipelagic state ................................. 37
      5.1.2. Increasing global role through middle-power diplomacy ....................................................... 38
      5.1.3. Expand engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, which covers countries along the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean ............................................................................................... 39
      5.1.4. Formulate and implement foreign policies based on public participation ................. 40
      5.1.5. The realm of defense and security ................................................................................................. 41
      5.1.6. Indonesia-US relations ....................................................................................................................... 42
      5.1.7. Indonesia-China relations ................................................................................................................ 43
1. Introduction

On October 20, 2014, Joko Widodo – or “Jokowi” as he is popularly known in Indonesia – became the president of the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, third-largest democracy, and fourth-largest nation. Many experts described Jokowi’s election as historical, considering the fact that – as opposed to his six predecessors – Widodo is the first ever president elected from outside the army and the Jakarta-based political elite. The former furniture exporter started his political career in 2005, when he became the mayor of his hometown, Surakarta. Due to his continuous political success in 2012, Jokowi became the governor of Indonesia’s capital city, Jakarta from where he rose to presidency in 2014. Yet, his meteoric rise to presidency – which was compared to Barack Obama’s journey to the White House by some reporters – could come at a price. Given President Jokowi’s lack of political experience, combined with his expressed intent to focus rather on domestic issues than international affairs, many political leaders in the region were concerned about Indonesia’s new leader.

For better or worse, Jokowi’s election definitely marks a new era in Indonesia’s foreign policy, especially in light of his predecessor’s decade of stability. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s active foreign policy of the last decade elevated Indonesia to a middle power status, while the country successfully reinforced its regional leadership. To fulfil the void left after Yudhoyono’s ten years of clear and well-established foreign policy, Jokowi must adapt quickly and wisely.

In the present paper, I am going to examine the Indonesian foreign policy, paying crucial attention to the country’s past decade. Doing so, I am going to also investigate Jokowi’s so-called “visi-misi” program – the Indonesian foreign policy agenda for the next five years – making it the centerpiece of my analysis. By addressing the most prominent foreign policy objectives and challenges I am going to attempt to give a comprehensive summary of Indonesia’s current foreign policy. Bearing all that in mind, it is important to note there are many other key factors that were purposely left out from this consideration. Therefore, areas like Indonesia’s social, religious and cultural factors, the country’s political system, pre-colonial history or its economic development fall beyond the scope of the present paper. Furthermore, through examining Jokowi’s background and personality I argue
that Joko Widodo’s election could result loss of prestige for Indonesia both regionally and globally. Thus the hypothesis of the present paper is the following:

‘If Jokowi fails to properly address and manage Indonesia’s most burning challenges – due to his lack of experience in diplomacy or the country’s rising nationalist passion – then the archipelagic state will likely experience some losses of its hard-fought prestige and credibility both regionally and globally.’

In addition to that, I am going to provide answers to three particular questions in order to help to prove the validity of my hypothesis. They are the following:

1. **In what way and to what extent could the new president’s personality affect the foreign policy of Indonesia?**
2. **What are Jokowi’s most prominent foreign policy objectives?**
3. **What are the most burning implementational challenges ahead of Jokowi?**

In terms of methodology, qualitative research will be used in this paper. More precisely, secondary content analysis will be employed, by using secondary data, such as books, articles, journals, periodicals or other electronic sources.

Furthermore, the reason behind the choice of topic is my personal affection towards the region and Indonesia in particular. But beyond that, I am convinced that in 21st century – which is called by many experts as the “Asia-Pacific century” in light of Asia’s elevated and undeniably central role in world politics – it would be a painful mistake for any nation to disregard the importance of the Southeast Asian region. This region is singlehandedly responsible for a remarkable average annual GDP growth of 6 percent since 2004 and aggregate GDP of 3.3 percent of the world’s total. In this prosperous yet quite diverse region, Indonesia has a leading role. Given all that, it is safe to say that any foreign policy planner should take Indonesia into serious consideration. In addition to that, the Indonesian model - that shows that Islam is not incompatible with democracy or modernity – can also be a good example for the current European and American leaders, especially when millions of refugees and migrants are flowing into Europe and the United States months after months.

This paper is divided into four important chapters. After this introduction, the second chapter provides us with a theoretical framework, in which the Indonesian foreign policy can be better understood. Focusing on the a sub-field of International Relations (IR), the so-
called Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), the first segment helps us to bring foreign policy decisions - made by leaders in charge – closer.

The third chapter serves historical introductory purposes. In other words, it helps us to put the most recent foreign policy developments in Indonesia into a historical context. That way, for instance, the army’s privileged situation within the Indonesian society, became immediately clear.

The fourth chapter concentrates on the country’s foreign policy after the independence. More precisely it focuses on the last decade’s two major political leader: Yudhoyono and Jokowi and their foreign policy.

Finally, in the fifth chapter, I am going observe President Jokowi’s “visi-misi” program. The 41-page document has been the subject of relentless criticism ever since it was published in 2014. Yet, considering the fact that this document is so far the only reliable source of the Indonesian Government’s view on foreign policy objectives, its detailed discussion is necessary.
2. Theoretical framework of FPA

To put theory into practice, first we need to establish the basic theoretical premises of foreign policy analysis (FPA), from where we can depart. Yet, defining FPA is harder than one would think, considering the fact that there are as many concepts of FPA as there are experts in this area. Definition varies from scholar to scholar and from study to study. However, in search for the proper definition, I came across Valerie Hudson’s view on the subject that perfectly captured the essence of foreign policy analysis. Thus, in order to fulfil the theoretical requirement to provide a more or less general definition, I am going to rely on her understanding of FPA. According to her, FPA focuses on “decisions taken by human decisionmakers with reference to or having known consequences for entities external to their nation-state. Such decisions entail action, inaction, and even indecision. Usually such decisions directly target external entities in the form of influence attempts (even influence in the first place of domestic actors), but they may include decisions that target domestic entities but have ramifications for external entities. One is almost always examining not a single decision, but a constellation of decisions taken with reference to a particular situation.” [2007:4] Summarizing this complex definition, FPA is a branch of political science, more precisely a sub-field of International Relations (IR), that investigates foreign policy decisions made by people or groups of people “in positions of authority to commit the resources of the nation-state.” [Hudson 2007:4] However, there seems to be a broad agreement among scholars that approaches may differ, depending on what factors one takes into account. As noted by Garrison: “It is now broadly accepted that different levels of analysis - individual factors, inputs into the decision process, and institutional as well as cultural and societal factors - converge to shape foreign policy outputs.” [2003:155] In addition, the complexity of FPA is even more obvious in light of its involvement with other respected fields of study. FPA is often associated with a range of different disciplines from political science to economics and from sociology to psychology.

Having discussed the FPA’s complexity, it is also important to introduce its paradigmatic bases or “seminal works” that allowed its blossoming during the 1950s and 1960s. Starting with Richard Snyder, Henry Bruck, and Burton Sapin who introduced a multi-level approach to FPA in 1954, by emphasizing the importance of both the micro and the macro level of decision-making. Their work inspired scholars to look below the nation-
state level at the actual players involved in the decision-making process. Two years later, in 1956, Margaret and Harold Sprout came forward with idea that the “psycho-milieu” of the individuals and groups, involved in the making of foreign policy decision, is just as important as the players and the circumstances of it. In response, a decade later, in 1966, James Rosenau introduced his actor-specific theory that pointed out the gravity of integrating information at several levels of analysis, from individual leaders to the international system. [Garrison 2003:155]

The first period in the evolution of foreign policy analysis occurred between the 1960s and 1980s, during which great intellectual effort was put into the conceptualization of the actor-specific theory at various levels of analysis. It resulted in three important concepts, along with many others. Firstly, the so-called group decision-making process, that analyzes the mechanism and structure of groups making foreign policy decisions. The groups – depending on their size – may vary from very small groups to large organizations and bureaucracies. Secondly, the small group dynamics that revealed the unique process of decision-making in small groups. Social psychologist discovered that the motivation to maintain group consensus and personal acceptance by the group could deteriorate decision-making quality. Thirdly, the conceptualization of organizational process and bureaucratic politics that put organizational and bureaucratic influence in decision-making under the scope. According to this concept, organizations will most likely put their own survival at the top of their list of priorities, while jealously guard and seek to increase their relative influence and strength. [Allison 1969:698-715]

Directing our attention to the psychological and societal milieu of foreign policy decision-making, it is important to understand the mind behind the decision. The context - in which decisionmakers operate – is fashioned by many factors, like culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, and demographics. Yet, within this context, the individual mind is unique in its own personal beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, memory, national, and self-conceptions. The understanding of the socio-psychological context of the decision-making resulted two essential findings:

1. **National and societal characteristics.** This approach focuses on one’s perception of its nation’s place in the world. Once it was properly perceived, decision-makers could make their decisions according to it. Additionally, cultural background - as an independent variable that effects foreign policy
decisions – was also recognized as a decisive factor. Therefore it is safe to say that one’s cultural heritage and socialization could affect the decision.

2. **Individual characteristics.** According to this concept, the understanding of personal characteristics of those who are involved in the decision-making process, is essential. Under certain stressful conditions these individual characteristics could easily become decisive factors. With emphasis given to the role of perception it is clear that misunderstanding and misperception in foreign policy situations could have crucial consequences and could lead to the use of stereotypical images far more often.

At this point, another important concept must be introduced with regard to the actor-specific approach. The long-criticized and extremely contradictory Rational Actor Model or “RAM” - based on the rational choice theory – embodies the realists’ view in FPA. Allison defines RAM as the following: “Governments select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives.” Furthermore he continues that “the nation or government, conceived as a rational, unitary decisionmaker, is the agent. This actor has one set of specified goals (the equivalent of a consistent utility function), one set of perceived options, and a single estimate of consequences that follow from each alternative.” [1969:694] In other words, a rational actor would make its decision by setting and ranking priorities, considering other alternatives, assessing the consequences and maximizing the profit.

Having discussed the complex, yet quite comprehensive discipline of foreign policy analysis, it is important to note that there is a lot more to be told - regarding its most recent developments - that would worth further exploration. However, I am convinced that enough has been said about FPA to provide us with the appropriate theoretical framework, in which the most recent developments of the Indonesian foreign policy can be more objectively and clearly judged.
3. The historical overview of Indonesia

Dealing with the current foreign policy of Indonesia it is important to keep in mind that this country has an enormous and vivid heritage that covers more than one and a half thousand years. A heritage that goes beyond the classical historical sense of the word and includes political, cultural, religious and other factors as well. My goal in this segment therefore is to give a short summary of Indonesia’s history - with introductory purposes - which will help us to reach a better understanding of the country’s current foreign policy goals and challenges. In other words, this section is designed to allow us to put the most recent developments in Indonesia – regarding its foreign policy – into a historical context. Doing so, I am going to focus only and exclusively on historical events that shaped the country’s image throughout centuries and resulted in the birth of the modern Indonesia as it is today. It may seem incomprehensive and partial, lacking of important details but once again: it only serves introductory purposes. Bearing that in mind, this section is divided into three parts: Indonesia under colonial rule; independence; the modern Indonesia.

3.1. Indonesia under colonial rule

It was the Portuguese who first came to the Southeast Asian region with the intention to acquire trading post and outpost in the sixteenth century. However, in case of Indonesia, the most significant European power that shaped the country’s history from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century, was the Netherlands. Shortly after the establishment of the United East India Company (VOC)\(^1\) in 1602, the Dutch started to move quickly toward Southeast Asia, more precisely toward the Indonesian archipelago. The first involvement of the Dutch East India Company in Indonesia – as the British refer to it – became apparent through trading with local kingdoms, with the intention to monopolize the spice trade to Europe. The Netherlands’ technological superiority allowed them to expel the Portuguese from Ambon and then to destroy the local kingdoms.\(^2\) [Ricklefs 1993:22-31, Church 2009:43]

---

\(^1\)VOC: Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie
\(^2\)In 1619, the VOC launched an attack on Jayakarta – a major trading town of the West Java kingdom of Bantan – where they later established their own colonial headquarter. Jayakarta was re-named Batavia and became the capital city of the VOC, until the declaration of independence in August 1945, when it was re-named once again, but this time as Jakarta, the current capital city of Indonesia.
The physical presence of the Netherlands in the Indonesian archipelago was not as quick and obvious as one would think. For Indonesia the period during which the Dutch established their colonial rule extended for three hundred years. [Osborne 2013:83] Between the seventeenth and eighteenth century the VOC behaved as a local kingdom, creating and breaking alliances, waging war on rivals and trading widely both within the archipelago and with China, India and Europe. However, it was not until 1756 when the Dutch gained control over the whole of Java, by successfully managed to divide the most prominent kingdom—namely the Mataram kingdom of Central Java – against itself. By the time the VOC went bankrupt in 1796 – due to corruption – it controlled Java, Ambon, and small nearby islands, and small enclaves in central and southern Sumatra, thus becoming the most powerful State in the archipelago. After the bankruptcy the Netherlands Crown took over the VOC’s assets, establishing the Netherlands East Indies government. The reason behind the newly established government seeking closer control and more uniform administration may seem evident from the Dutch pint of view, when we take into account the fact that for them – due to the pressure of economic demand and foreign competition – it was no longer sufficient to maintain a loose control over the archipelago. Through the nineteenth century this government gradually extended its control over Sumatra and eastern Indonesia. In 1905 the Netherlands East Indies destroyed the Balinese kingdom after bitter resistance had been overcome. A few years later, in 1911 when Dutch defeated the powerful kingdom of Aceh, the basic structure of the Dutch East Indies had been established. [Church 2009:44] Once again, it is important to emphasize the fact that the establishment of the Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia took nearly 300 years and was a very slow and crucial process. In addition, only the tiny Portuguese colony located in the east of Timor managed to escape the Dutch. [Ricklefs 1993: 81-108]

By the beginning of the twentieth century, with the creation of the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch had established a centralized state. Its power was concentrated in the capital, Batavia, with an efficient bureaucracy, police and military service that allowed them to maintain social control. Yet the political control was not accompanied by considerable impact in terms of Dutch culture or technology. There was, however, a huge and undeniable economic impact as the Dutch exploited the area, working through and with the Javanese elite and Chinese tax agents to extract the maximum agricultural production for their own benefit. [Osborne 2013:84] On the one hand, this economic impact gradually destroyed regional trading networks that had existed for centuries, with indigenous traders restricted to
local trade. External trade became the privilege of European companies, whereas inter-regional trade remained in the hands of Chinese who were encouraged to immigrate from southern China.\(^3\) On the other hand this economic impact changed the Javanese agriculture hugely, resulting in dramatic transformations by the end of the nineteenth century. The Dutch introduced the so-called “Cultivation System”, by which Javanese farmers were expected to produce designated crops for sale to the State at fixed prices. These crops – mostly sugar, indigo, coffee, tea, tobacco, rubber, and later oil – were then transported for sale to European markets. Nevertheless, this economic development led to numerous consequences. For instance the growing number of the population of Indonesia, the shrinkage of uncultivated lands, the expansion of cities and towns, urbanization and a significantly higher rate of export, just to mention a few. [Church 2009:45]

All things considered, the period of the Dutch colonial rule undoubtedly left its mark on Indonesia. Whether it was simply the case of exploitation or a less one-sided arrangement between the Dutch and Indonesia, one thing is for certain: for the first time in its history, Indonesia became a centralized and developing country, yet it still remained under foreign rule.

### 3.2. Independence

Before any further discussion of how Indonesia gained its independence, two major events need to be addressed properly. Firstly, the concept of Indonesian nationalism that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. Secondly, the Japanese aggression during the Second World War.

The first people who referred to themselves as Indonesian, rather than as a member of an ethnic group were young man and woman who had received a Western education at local high schools of some sort, and then subsequently at universities in the Netherlands. The term “Indonesia” was used for the first time in the early 1920s. However, within a decade, the idea of being Indonesian and the effort to create a modern nation free from Dutch colonial rule was widely accepted. The first public expression of nationalism in Indonesia took place in 1928 when a national Youth Congress was held in Batavia, at which thousands of young and emotionally aroused man and women witnessed the ceremonial rising of the

---

\(^3\)Chinese had long been resident in the Indonesian archipelago from the early centuries, predominantly as traders and merchants, yet the steady growth in their numbers occurred only in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.
red and white flag, recited a National Pledge and sang the newly composed national song. Thus it is safe to say that the idea of an independent Indonesia, with a common flag, a more or less widely spoken language that would be Bahasa Indonesia which differed from the Malaysian language, and a national identity which would overcome regional and ethnic disputes, was a generally accepted concept by the early 1920s. [Church 2009:46] The magnitude of the nationalist movement was never really understood nor was it comprehensively handled by the Dutch colonial government for it was seen as a dangerous but not an immediate threat. The more the nationalist movement escalated, the more restrictive laws were made by the Dutch to resolve the problem. That meant that political activists were repeatedly imprisoned and exiled. When the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)\(^4\) tried to gain independency through poorly planned uprisings in November 1926 and January 1927, it resulted in mass imprisonments. Thousands of Indonesians, many of whom had only a little to do with the PKI, were either jailed or exiled to a political prison. In addition, the PKI was declared illegal by the Dutch government following the uprisings in 1926-27. [Ricklefs 1993:163-198]

At this point one particular person has to be mentioned by name, a young engineering graduate who was exiled in February 1934, for the same political reasons, Sukarno. This charming and charismatic person – who later become the President of Indonesia – successfully spread the simple message of freedom to the average Indonesians all across the nation, in urban and in rural areas as well. Sukarno’s nationalist concept was simple: all Indonesians must set aside their religious and ethnic differences in order to unite in opposition to the Dutch colonial rule. [Church 2009: 47-48]

During the Second World War the Japanese occupied Indonesia in March 1942, with a very little resistance from the Dutch. However, at first, they were welcomed by most of the Indonesians, since they were seen as the savior of the country from the Dutch suppression. Yet it did not take too long for the Japanese to alienate themselves from the Indonesians. By introducing the so-called “romusha”\(^5\), the Japanese successfully managed to upset most of the Javanese society, because it affected almost every family. The Indonesians soon realized that the Japanese – despite their demagogue propaganda – were equally bad, if not worse than their Dutch predecessors. However, there were some long

\(^{4}\)PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia

\(^{5}\)The compulsory labour programme that required all able-bodied males to provide free labour for war efforts. It was used within Indonesia, for projects that targeted infrastructural developments, such as building railway lines, ships and roads.
term benefits for Indonesia. Firstly, the fact that the Japanese removed the Dutch government from its administrative function, allowing Indonesians to fulfill political positions that they would not have been able to obtain under colonial rule. This administrative experience came handy after 1945. Secondly, the Japanese declared the use of Dutch language illegal, while they simultaneously promoted the use of Japanese and – for pragmatic reasons – Indonesian language too. Thirdly, the Japanese, in order to support their war efforts, started to train young Indonesians to become soldiers. Again, this military training proved to be useful when Indonesia later had to defy the re-occupying Dutch forces between 1946 and 1949. Last but not least, the occupying Japanese forces freed the earlier jailed political prisoners. Among these newly freed, mostly nationalist leaders, were the earlier mentioned Sukarno who managed to continuously spread his firm beliefs of being Indonesian. [Ricklefs 1993:199-211, Church 2009:49]

By the beginning of 1945 it was clear that Japan was losing the war. In order to make it as hard as possible for the Western powers to regain power of their former colonies, they started to promote nationalist movements and the concept of an independent Indonesia. While the withdrawing Japanese forces encouraged the Indonesian nationalists to come up with a desirable constitutional framework, the expelled Netherlands Indies Administration was waiting in Brisbane, Australia – where they had spent the war years – to reclaim what they thought was rightfully theirs. However, shortly after the nuclear blast in Hiroshima and Nagasaki that brought the Pacific War to an end, nationalist leaders led by Sukarno declared Indonesia’s independency unilaterally. As simple as it was, on 17 August 1945, with a flag rising ceremony in Jakarta, the Republic of Indonesia was born. Yet the newly gained independence was far from a global recognition considering the fact that the Dutch were having a hard time letting Indonesia – the largest and the most populated country in the Southeast Asian region – go. After officially rejecting Indonesia’s declaration of independence by saying that Sukarno’s government was illegitimate, the Netherlands began to re-occupy the country. [Church 2009:50] Indeed, by January 1946 the Dutch were in control of Batavia (Jakarta) and were trying to re-establish their rule. However, at first, the returning Dutch made the impression that they were going to accept the claim of the Indonesians to independence in order to avoid the bloodshed. Bearing that in mind it is important to note that among Indonesia’s nationalist leaders there were significant differences of opinion on how the country should protect itself against the Dutch. The most important disagreement occurred between those who wanted to put an immediate end to the
Dutch aggression, using military forces and guerilla warfare if necessary, and between those who wanted to reinforce the newly gained independence through negotiation, using diplomatic channels. At first glance, the diplomatic way to manage this crisis seemed more appealing. However, the direct contrast between the Dutch and Indonesian point of view soon became evident, when the two opposing governments realized that their concepts of Indonesia’s future were not even on nodding terms with each other. The Dutch wanted to create a federal Indonesian state - the “United States of Indonesia” – made up of some semi-autonomous units that would help the Netherlands to prolong their unwelcoming stay. However, this scenario was unacceptable for the Indonesian nationalist leaders, for they saw this federal vision as an instrument to strengthen the regional differences within Indonesia by giving autonomy to some of the states but not to the whole country. In the meantime, the Indonesian struggle for independence became an everyday topic in international politics. The newly formed global institution, the United Nations, along with the United States of America, were constantly increasing diplomatic pressure on the Dutch to resolve the problem in a peaceful manner. Unfortunately, the growing global pressure on the Netherlands combined with the fact the Indonesian nationalist leaders became more and more convinced that the only way to achieve independence was through military actions – led to some huge mistakes that changed the course of diplomatic negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesians once and for all. The most prominent mistake was the so-called “police actions”6 launched by the Dutch. The outcome of the police actions were catastrophic and irreversible for the Dutch, since they united the whole country, including the nationalist leaders who finally were able to set aside their differences, in order to achieve the grater goal. Although the Dutch troops made military advances in both of the police actions, in doing so they have lost something even bigger, the political positions they held in Indonesia and the support of their Western allies. The situation – due to huge loss in casualties caused by the guerilla warfare – became unbearable for Dutch by the end of 1949. After four years of diplomatic negotiations and military actions the Netherlands decided to give up Indonesia and agreed to transfer its sovereignty. In December 1949, an agreement was finally achieved between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands that brought the revolution and the Dutch colonial rule to end, thus resulting the birth of an independent Indonesia. [Osborne 2013:180-184, Ricklefs 1993:212-236]

---

6These actions were police actions only by name, since they were purely military and not police campaigns that were undertaken by the Dutch firstly in July 1947, followed by the second police action from December 1948 to January 1949.
The modern Indonesia

In spite of the newly gained independence at the end of 1949, the infant state of Indonesia experienced some major unresolved issues and challenges that need to be addressed in order to understand the very recent history of the country. Firstly, the role played by the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) during the revolution. The PKI was only one of the many political groups that joined together on the nationalist side during the course of struggle for independence, unlike the situation in Vietnam, where the communists became the leaders of nationalist movements. However, the PKI never stopped seeking its own political agenda, even after joining the anti-Dutch movement. This soon led to an attempted coup, poorly executed by the leaders of the PKI to take over the leadership of the revolutionary movement in Indonesia. This attempt ended in a bitter failure during September 1948, which has been known ever since as the Madiun Affair. [Osborne 2013:185]

Secondly, so-called Darul Islam, the ideal of Indonesia as a fundamentalist Islamic state. The support of the Darul Islam came from those areas of Indonesia where adherence to Islamic teachings and precepts were the strongest. During the second “police action”, some of the followers of Darul Islam tried to gain control of territory through physical force, yet again, the scenario was the same as the Madiun Affairs, where the revolutionary army put an end to an unsuccessful attempt. However, the Darul Islam continued to oppose the central government ever since by advocating the transformation of Indonesia into an Islamic state. Notably, the Indonesian nationalist leaders in the 1920s and 1930s agreed that after gaining independence, Indonesia should be a secular state, which concept was generally accepted and thus adopted after the revolution. The reason behind that was simple: to overcome the religious diversity of Indonesia, the secular state was seen as the only alternative. However, this is still one of the most sensitive issue in Indonesia nowadays. [Osborne 2013:186; Church 2009:48]

Thirdly, the central role of the Indonesian army. During the revolution the army played a vital role to maintain the existence of the revolutionary government. The continuous military efforts, undertaken by the Indonesian army, left the armed forces with a very special

---

7After the failed coup the communists suffered near total eclipse. The Indonesian revolutionary army led by Colonel A.H. Nasution were sent in to Madiun – where the communists were operating from - to eliminate the resistance. The events in Madiun still agitates the surface of the Indonesian politics, almost seventy years later.
place within the society. From organized military actions to guerilla warfare, the Indonesian army successfully managed to protect Indonesia’s sovereignty and unity, not just against the Dutch troops during the revolution, but also against the Communists and the supporters of the Darul Islam. Having established the importance of the Indonesian army, it is safe to say that it is recognized as the guardian of the state with its own special right to play a political role in Indonesia. [Osborne 2013:187]

Last but not least, Indonesia’s diversity will always pose challenges – to some extent – to central control and authority. The national motto of Indonesia, “Unity in Diversity”, is a perfect reflection of this challenge, suggesting that regional and other differences had always played a major part of the country’s life.

These underlying issues shaped the Indonesian political developments after 1949, when Sukarno became the first president of the independent, secular Republic of Indonesia. Yet the most prominent challenge between 1946 and 1965 was the de-colonization, where several groups fought for control of the state. Firstly, those who wanted a multi-party parliamentary democracy copied from Western states. Secondly, - in opposition of the first group – there were those wanted a consensus parliamentary system, stating that the imported Western liberal democracy was in contradiction with the Indonesian cultural and political values. Thirdly, those who wanted to create some sort of Marxist or a democratic socialist state. Among them, the Communists were the most visible and the strongest force. Lastly, there were those, wanted the new state to be based on Islam. In addition, the army generally supported the second group with the ideal of a consensus political system. [Church 2009:51]

The turning-point of this political debate occurred in 30 September, 1965 with the so-called “coup”8, when the Indonesian army proved its dominance in Indonesian politics. After the events of 1965, the military-dominated government led by President Suharto restructured the Indonesian politics and a new era – called as the “New Order” as opposed to President Sukarno’s “Old Order” – began. As we have seen, Indonesia started out as liberal democracy with a multi-party parliamentary system, a free and diverse press and a freedom of voluntarily organized groups, including labour unions. However, the popular

---

8The peak of political instability occurred in 1965, with rumors of Sukarno being terminally ill. On 30 September 1965, a group of low-ranking army officers declared the coup. The next day, the PKI announced that they support the coup and the new government. However, shortly after the overthrow of the Indonesian Government, an army general named Suharto, took the strategic army reserve in Jakarta and put an end to the coup. Over the next six months Suharto ruthlessly retaliated the failed coup. During this period the leaders of the coup – including the leaders of PKI who were blamed for the failure – were arrested or killed along with more than 400,000 people.
President Sukarno had always been against this Western-style democracy – what he called “50 per cent plus one democracy” – emphasizing the fact that it was not a good suit for Indonesia. Sukarno argued that a democracy with leadership would be a better fit for the country. After 1965, Suharto continued Sukarno’s idea of democracy by introducing the so-called “Guided Democracy”, a system which balanced political party representation in parliament with representatives from functional groups, such as the armed forces, workers, peasants, Muslim scholars and minority groups. The functional group of the army – Golkar – quickly became the strongest, since Suharto’s government openly supported them. [Ricklefs 1993:237-303, Church 2009:52]

Elections had been held every five years since 1971, yet the outcome was anything but a surprise. Golkar received all the government funds and the support of the bureaucratic and military apparatus, thus won two-thirds or more of the votes in each and every elections until 1997. Suharto’s system of New Order lasted for 32 years. In spite of the economic growth that the system delivered, authoritarianism, corruption and nepotism marked the Suharto era. The government intentionally de-politicized the Indonesian society by for instance exercising firm control over the press, including television networks. Magazines, newspapers and books could not be published without the government’s approval. Sadly, those who benefited the most of the new system owed their wealth rather to political connections than their business skills. Moreover, the gap between the military and political elite and the average urban or rural citizens become wider. However, it is important to note that due to the positive effects of economic growth, ordinary Indonesians enjoyed better clothing and housing, basic healthcare and educational opportunities, not to mention the steady growth in agricultural production. Also, there was a quick growth in the urban middle class which behaved as any other middle class in modern societies. The problem of Suharto’s succession turned into a crisis in 1997. Ever since the 1990s a strong criticism was formulated mostly by the urban middle class towards the aging Suharto and the inability to perform his duties. Instead of responding to this disquiet in time, Suharto turned to his family and cronies and used force to punish any disobedience. The closed political system that he had created did not allow open debates regarding any of the important state matters. When the Asian financial crisis hit the Indonesia economy in 1997, Suharto had lost his final source of legitimacy, the country’s economic growth. The overall dissatisfaction with the Suharto regime, combined with the street demonstrations organized by university students, left no other choice for President Suharto but to resign. Indeed, after the dramatic resignation of
Suharto in 1998, his vice-president, Dr B.J. Habibie, took over the presidential duties as it was stipulated in the Indonesian Constitution. However, due to the persistent protest and urban violence it was clear for Habibie that the situation called for new elections to be organized. [Church 2009:53-56, Ricklefs 1993:304-309]

In June 1999, the general elections passed unexpectedly peacefully, leaving the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) – led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno – with the largest block of seats, while Golkar came third. Months after the general election, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) – the body that elects the new president, made up of government and military appointees – started the preliminary hearings of the possible presidential candidates in October 1999. Surprisingly, Megawati lost the presidential elections to Abdurrahman Wahid who became the new President of Indonesia, with Megawati as his vice-president.

During President Habibie’s short term provisional governance between 1998 and 1999, an important event must be mentioned. Habibie agreed that a UN-supervised referendum regarding the autonomy of East Timor – which was under continuous Indonesian occupation since 1975 – would be held on 30 August 1999. The President also guaranteed that if the East Timorese people voted for independence from Indonesia, he would allow the partition. The voters – not surprisingly – choose to be free from Indonesia. However, after the referendum in East Timor a wave of violence occurred, in which more than 2,000 people died. The pro-Jakarta militias with some backing of the Indonesian army, burned down the capital of East Timor causing nothing but trouble and chaos in the area in question. When Habibie realized the magnitude of distraction caused by the militia and the army, he reluctantly agreed to a UN multinational peace-keeping operation that would restore the order in East Timor. The full independence was officially granted on 20 May 2002, thus resulting the birth of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. [Church 2009:57-58]

High expectations surrounded Wahid’s presidency from 1999 in Indonesia, hoping that the new president would unify the religiously, politically and socially fragmented country. Indeed, there was a lot to be done. Indonesians simply wanted a greater social and economic justice, jobs and their voice to be heard. Corruption, nepotism and wealth possessed by the small economic and political elite was no longer tolerable in the eyes of Indonesians. President Wahid, by introducing his programme called “Reformasi”, wanted to address these issues, however, he did not manage to meet these challenges. His incapability and lack of competence to resolve the underlying tension within the Indonesian society
finally alienated all of his previous supporters in the parliament and across the nation. After 20 months of poor leadership, at the end of which Wahid threatened to dissolve the parliament, he was removed from office by MPR, the same body that elected him. Again, in accordance with the Indonesian Constitution, Megawati – Wahid’s vice-president – took over the presidential duties. Being the first female President of Indonesia - the largest Muslim country in the world - combined with her father, Sukarno’s legacy, expectations towards Megawati were even higher than towards Wahid. Despite of her popularity, by 2003 she had lost most of her supporters due to the failure to meet the challenges in Indonesia of the twenty-first century. In addition, in 2002 the MPR passed a law that allowed the direct election of the president, thus in 2004, Indonesia’s first direct presidential election was held. A popular retired general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who had previously been the Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs, Security and Social Welfare under Megawati, decided to run for presidency after resigning his cabinet post due to disagreements with Sukarno’s daughter. In October 2004, Yudhoyono won the first direct presidential election and started his ten years of presidency. [Church 2009:59-63]

There is a lot more to be told regarding the history of Indonesia, yet it is important to note that the full and detailed historical review of the country falls beyond the scope of the present paper. My goal in this chapter simply was to introduce the vivid history of the largest country in the Southeast Asian region, in order to help to put the most recent events into historical context.
4. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo

In what way and to what extent could the new president affect the foreign policy of Indonesia? Does Jokowi’s lack of political experience worsen Indonesia’s current regional middle-power status and global aspirations? These are just a few of many important questions that were raised after October 20, 2014, when Joko Widodo – the current President of Indonesia – came into office. However, the outcome of the presidential election came for many experts as a surprise, considering the fact that Jokowi – as opposed to his six predecessors – did not rise to the presidency through the military or the political party system. [Connelly 2014:4] The former furniture business owner, Jokowi, started his political career in 2005 when he became the mayor of his hometown, Surakarta. He then joined to the Megawati led Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), where he soon became considered as the party’s new rising star. This chapter is therefore dedicated to reveal the ties between Jokowi’s personality and the developments in the Indonesian foreign policy. Doing so, first, I am going to focus on the Indonesian foreign policy after the independence, paying special attention to the past decade.

4.1. Post-colonial foreign policy

Ever since its independence, Indonesia always aimed to pursue a “free and active” foreign policy by introducing the concept of Politik Luar Negeri Bebas Aktif.\(^9\) [Clark 2011:292] However ironic it may seem, considering the country’s colonial past, this free and active foreign policy – as Mohammad Hatta, a former vice-president of Indonesia called it - had always a western-leaning approach. This neutral setting can be best demonstrated by the historic Bandung Asia-African Conference, held in April 1955, which led to the birth of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). [Parameswaran 2014:154] Indeed, this is considered as probably the greatest achievement of the earlier mentioned “Old Order” era of the Sukarno regime. At a time in which the Cold War divided the world into two blocs, Indonesia managed to stay independent from either of them, by expressing its empathy towards other nations with the same colonial experience as their own. With the emphasis given to its active,

\(^9\) Independent and Active Foreign Policy
rather than passive or reactive foreign policy, it is safe to say, that the formation of the NAM was a true embodiment of Indonesia’s neutral approach of handling international disputes and pursue settlements in the 1950s and 1960s. [Mendiolaza and Hardjakusumah 2013]

The western oriented foreign policy however, was revived by Sukarno in the late 1950s when he realized that the Western-style democracy was no longer the best fit for Indonesia. His hostile stance against what he called NEKOLIM (neo-colonialism and imperialism) soon led to a decline in relation with the West, more particularly with the United States. This tension became more apparent in 1955, shortly after the Bandung Conference, when the first ever democratic election was held in Indonesia. With the Communists (PKI) coming fourth, the result of the elections was an eye-opener for the United States. The US government was more and more convinced that Sukarno’s Indonesia was moving towards communism which – taking into account the US involvement against communists in Vietnam – was seen as an emerging threat in the region. Yet, it is important to note that most of the historians and experts seem to be in agreement regarding Sukarno’s stance on communism. According to them, Sukarno was never a communists but rather a nationalist who firmly defied colonialism and imperialism. In fact, his dalliance with China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s was purely platonic, for it was considered as an instrument to put pressure on the United States to intervene in the negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia regarding the province of West Irian.10 However the United States was reluctant to get involved in the dispute further along, since the Netherlands was a vital and fundamental NATO ally. [Clark 2011:293]

As far as regional aspirations and regionalism goes, two short-lived organization must be mentioned by name, firstly the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) which existed between 1961 and 1966 and consisted of Thailand, the Philippines, and what was then known as Malaya. Secondly, the MAPHILINDO which existed between 1963 and 1966 and consisted of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Both initiatives failed due to different reasons, many of which Sukarno was responsible for. What we know for fact is that both regional organizations were a direct consequence of the establishment of the US-backed Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was a Southeast Asian counterpart of NATO, and included countries like Pakistan, New Zealand, Australia, and England, with Thailand and the Philippines as the only Southeast Asian members. In addition, the idea

---

10When the Dutch formally transferred the sovereignty over to the Republic of Indonesia in 1949, the province of West Irian – now located in West Papua – was not included in the transfer.
behind creation of SEATO was the American intention to keep the Soviets and Chinese away from the region, which would continuously keep the United States’ influence alive. Ironically, the inability of the United States to realize the region’s diversity in terms of society, culture and religion, led to the inefficiency of the organization’s original goal. Due to what Sukarno considered as a gain of US influence in the region, he tried to secede from the United Nations, while warming up relations with China. In sum, both the failure of ASA and MAPHILINDO in 1966, and the removal of Sukarno from power in 1965, were essential ingredients in creating a fertile soil for the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. With Sukarno out of the picture, the reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia – the two major obstacles in the way of an otherwise peaceful regional cooperation – could finally begin. In 1967, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore established the ASEAN with the main object of promoting peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and rule of law. How is that possible then that during its first decade of existence, ASEAN achieved so little? The answer to that question is more complex than one would think. These nations became independent no so long ago, thus priority was rather given to the promotion of domestic economic development and stability, along with the crucial process of nation-building, than to the external relations. Even more so, intra-regional relation often featured lack of trust and intolerance. [Clark 2011:294-296, Anwar 1997:20-34]

With Suharto’s New Order era, Indonesia started to absorb political liberalism quite quickly and uniquely. Yet, it must be noted that the process of democratization – or as Suharto called it: “Guided Democracy” – came at a price. Nepotism, authoritarianism, corruption, firm control over the press were features of the Suharto regime. However, one of the undeniable upsides of the New Order was the continuous promotion of region-building, which - in accordance with Suharto’s insular system – was limited to the support of the only regional organization, ASEAN. It went so well, that it was not until the late 1980s when the Indonesian political elite started to question Suharto’s unconditional, and yet insular, affection towards ASEAN. [Clark 2012:91] Strong criticism, regarding the inability of ASEAN to resolve territorial disputes between the members, was one of the most visible sign of this general dissatisfaction. Indeed, the continuous unsuccessfulness of ASEAN in fostering peace in the region, became the most apparent – and yet the most irritating – weak spot of the organization. For instance, the tension between the Philippines and Malaysia over the disputed Malaysian sovereignty over Sabah, or border disputes between Thailand and
Malaysia, and the cross-border tension between Thailand and Cambodia, not to mention the feud between Indonesia and Malaysia, were definitely cases, where ASEAN failed to fulfil its role as a regional mediator between the member states. In addition, one must not forget that these long-disputed borders were direct consequences of the colonial rule in the region. For better or worse, it is safe to say, that these issues eroded the faith put in the organization. Thus it does not hit us as a surprise, when Indonesia – during the last decade of Suharto’s presidency – turned away from the ASEAN, while the country rediscovered its strong international orientation. By the time, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 hit the Indonesian market resulting in economic decline and later in Suharto’s historical resignation – which was owed to many other, previously discussed reasons as well –, it was clear that Indonesia’s constant, yet very limited interest in ASEAN was overcome by the country’s global aspiration. Following the void left by Suharto’s long-lived autocracy, Indonesia witnessed weak leaders, and as Parameswaran puts it: the “fear of impending Balkanization”. [2014:154] It was in this political context, when in 2004 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the first ever direct presidential elections and thus became the leader of Indonesia. [Clark 2011:297]

4.2. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

The former army general who also served in Megawati’s cabinet as Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs, Security and Social Welfare, had always showed interest in foreign policy-making during his years in the military. After a tense disagreement with Megawati over the fact that she left Yudhoyono out of her decisions, he resigned from the cabinet and decided to run for presidency. In October, 2004, when he first entered the State Palace in Jakarta as the President of Indonesia - by winning the first ever direct presidential election - his objects were clear: beside managing domestic challenges, he wanted to restore Indonesia’s faith in foreign policy by rebuilding the nation and restoring the country’s leadership role both on a regional and global scale. Experience in both foreign and domestic policy, and seniority in the military offered him a very special set of skills that he could rely on. In addition, it is worth mentioning that Yudhoyono, as the first Indonesian leader ever who had such close association with the US, completed military training programs in the States, at Fort Benning and Fort Leavenworth, and earned a Master’s degree in management from Webster University in St Louis. [Clark 2011:300] Bearing that in mind, it is safe to say
that – as noted by Connelly – “Yudhoyono was Indonesia’s indisputable leader on foreign policy”. [2014:2]

Yudhoyono’s both terms as a president are seen as a period of political stability and respectable economic growth that allowed him to pursue greater goals. For Jakarta to become a more active player in international politics, Yudhoyono introduced a new, multi-directive diplomacy, what is famously known as: “A million friends, zero enemies.” This approach can be described as a strategy, where Indonesia plays a bigger role regionally, while strengthening bilateral ties with individual countries. [Mendiolaza and Hardjakusumah 2013] Under President Yudhoyono Indonesia not only returned to pursue regional leadership status in ASEAN, but also started to take a stronger stance in organizations like the G20 and the United Nations. On the regional level, he proposed the idea of “dynamic equilibrium” as oppose to the traditional “balance of power” concept. According to the new concept, ASEAN members would work closer together with others in order to build mechanisms, like the East Asia Summit (EAS) or the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), where no one is dominant or excluded. In spite of differences between member states, these initiatives would help to create mutually beneficial relationships between them, allowing regional security to evolve. Overcoming its “free and active” foreign policy, Yudhoyono introduced a more “constructive approach” – as he put it – to gain the ability for Indonesia to act like a peacemaker, confidence builder, problem solver and bridge builder in the region. [Parameswaran 2014:155]

Yudhoyono’s “million friends and zero enemies” concept also brought changes in Indonesia’s bilateral relations. On the one hand, Youdhoyono warmed up ties with neighbouring countries, such as Australia, Malaysia or Singapore in order to achieve a more peaceful regional environment. That being said, we must note that this task proved to be quite challenging, considering the fact that from time to time, Yudhoyono had to overcome strong resistance from its own legislature, which wanted him to represent a much stronger stance in some cases. On the other hand, whilst improving relations with neighbouring countries, the president redefined bilateral relations with the United States, South Korea, India, Iran and with China as well. Taking the relationship between the United States and Indonesia for instance, Yudhoyono managed to strengthen the wavering link between them. Interesting, yet a rather less known fact is that the current President of the United States, Barack Obama spent four years of his early childhood living in Menteng Dalam, a suburb of Jakarta. As Clark pointed it out: “Obama once spoke Indonesian quite fluently, and even
today he speaks a smattering of Jakarta slang, accent free.” [2011:300] Bearing that in mind it is safe to say that when Yudhoyono’s on-again–off-again 2010 Presidential visit finally occurred in Washington, an instant bond between Obama and Yudhoyono was established. With Indonesia’s elevated role and the more international orientation of the country – sometimes at the expense of an ASEAN focus – other nations in the region started to raise their eyebrows. Whether it was the case of pure jealousy or “why not me too?-ism” – as Clark describes it – one thing is for certain that Indonesia stepped out of its traditional role under Yudhoyono and became a regional leader and a global player in international politics. When Barack Obama made his visit in the region in 2010, he intentionally chose Jakarta to be the host of the US Presidential visit in the Southeast Asian region. Once again, criticism towards Indonesia was formulated by many other nations in the region, saying that the country perhaps became too big for its boots. [Clark 2011:300-301]

Another important consequence of Yudhoyono’s decade in power was the ongoing institutional reform regarding the Indonesian foreign policy-making system which started under Hassan Wirajuda, the foreign minister of Indonesia under Megawati and later under Yudhoyono’s first term. The goal was to shift responsibility – regarding foreign policy matters – from the military to the foreign ministry, thus eliminating the constant institutional rivalry between them. Under Suharto’s New Order, foreign policy was the privilege of the president and a few key advisors, many of whom were former officers in the Indonesian armed forces. Moreover army generals were often appointed ambassadors and high-ranking diplomats. In sum, the military was in full control of the foreign ministry. Ironically – considering the fact that Yudhoyono himself was a former general in the Indonesian army and had the seniority in the military – this was about to change when started his presidency. As Connelly pointed it out: “the former general turned president made clear that, in a democratic Indonesia, the military would be subordinate to the foreign ministry on matters of diplomacy.” [2014:3] By professionalizing the diplomatic corps and pushing for a greater degree of civilian control in foreign affairs, Yudhoyono successfully turned the sluggish foreign policy unit into well-operating engine of diplomacy. In addition, seniority in military proved to be a great instrument at his disposal, offering Yudhoyono a considerable degree of deference within the army, thus allowing him to push his reforms through. Yet, when ministers, diplomats or generals disagreed with him, Yudhoyono simply overruled them, thus keeping the final say in his hand at all time. [Connelly 2014:2-4]
From an economic point of view, under Yudhoyono, the Indonesian economy grew by an average 5.8 percent annually. [ERIA 2014] Yet, his failure to address structural shortcomings like the barely functioning infrastructure, the robust bureaucracy system, the rigid labour market and poor education and health systems, continued to discourage foreign investors. As a result, rising economic nationalism has led to protectionist policies, accompanied by a trade and industry law favoring domestic companies. [Parameswaran 2014:156]

As far as military related issues are concerned, the country’s defense budget has tripled during Yudhoyono’s decade, yet it has never reached one percent of the overall Indonesian GDP11. [The World Bank 2015] Considering the fact that Indonesia’s neighbors – such as China, Malaysia or Vietnam – spending way more than one percent of their GDP on defense, the country’s inability to perform even the most basic functions is understandable. The constant failure to protect its own territorial water will always pose a huge amount of challenge for the country, when we take the fact into account that Indonesia has the world’s second-largest coastline.

To conclude Yudhoyono’s decade of presidency, Indonesia became a global middle power in international politics. Taking independent yet firm positions in the United Nations and in the G20 on issues like the civil war in Syria or climate change – just to mention a few – are examples of that.12 Yudhoyono’s Indonesia proved its worthiness on a regional level as well, by reclaiming its leading role in ASEAN. Improved bilateral relations and institutional reforms – regarding the Indonesian foreign policy – were also the hallmarks of the Yudhoyono era. With the capability and willingness to employ proactive diplomacy, Yudhoyono’s multi-directive diplomacy – or as earlier noted: “a million friends and zero enemies” policy – elevated Indonesia to a whole new level. Despite all of its great credentials regarding foreign policy, one shortcoming of the Yudhoyono era must be noted, namely the fact that while foreign affairs became the undeniable priority of the president, he disregarded numerous important domestic issues by putting external concerns ahead of internal matters. Indeed, as noted by Parameswaran: “religious intolerance against minorities rose in Indonesia and anti-corruption efforts ran into major setbacks during his second five-year

11Percentages taken from World Bank data on military expenditure (% of GDP). The World Bank
12“As one of the co-chairs of a UN High-Level Panel on the post-2015 global development agenda, Yudhoyono emphasized the importance of poverty alleviation and sustainable prosperity. And in the field of climate change, Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest greenhouse gas emitter, has projected itself as a leader, unilaterally declaring in 2009 an ambitious target of cutting emissions by 26 percent (or 41 percent with international assistance) by 2020.” [Parameswaran 2014: 155]
Yudhoyono’s lack of focus on domestic issues came at a price. Nationalist voices – criticizing Yudhoyono’s vision of an international Indonesia – became stronger and more apparent not just in Jakarta, but all across the nation. The domestic political environment seemed to be in favor of the nationalist minded Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a populist party led by Megawati. However, in April, 2014, the party underperformed in legislative elections. When Joko “Jokowi” Widodo – the rising star of Megawati’s PDI-P – won the presidential election six months later, many feared that as oppose to Yudhoyono’s decade of stability and firm foreign policy, Indonesia will lose its hard-fought position both globally and regionally. Finally, returning to Connelly’s above mentioned statement: Yudhoyono “will leave a void in Indonesia’s foreign policy-making system”, for he “was Indonesia’s indisputable leader on foreign policy.”

4.3. Joko “Jokowi” Widodo

Having discussed Yudhoyono’s role in the Indonesian foreign policy of the last decade, now let us take a good look on his successor, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, the current President of Indonesia. Doing so, two major factor must be mentioned at this point. Firstly, the fact that – as oppose to his six predecessors – Jokowi’s rise to presidency is not associated with neither the army, nor the Jakarta-based political elite. Secondly, the inarguable fact that – as oppose to his famous predecessor, Yudhoyono – Jokowi was lacking years of political experience regarding foreign affairs. On the one hand, in the eyes of Indonesians Jokowi is a true hero, the people’s president who could bring major changes into the long-criticized Indonesian political system. On the other hand, for the same exact reason that allowed him to criticize the army-led political system so vehemently, - the fact that he had nothing do with the corrupt army and the Jakarta-based political elite – resulted his inexperience in politics. The latter was crucially emphasized by Jokowi’s opponent, the army’s candidate for the presidential seat, the former Special Forces General, Prabowo Subianto. In spite the fact that forecasts predicted a close race between Jokowi and Subianto, Widodo managed to win the presidential election – by very little - during the summer of 2014 and started his term in October 2014.

Having struggled to fulfill the hole left by Yudhono’s decade of stability and firm foreign policy, Jokowi’s presidency had always been surrounded by high expectations ever since its beginning. Many criticized President Jokowi for lacking a comprehensive and clear vision on the country’s foreign policy direction, especially in light of his predecessor’s
success in that area. Yet, in Jokowi’s defense, it is important to note that his electoral victory is owed to the eroded domestic political environment in Indonesia rather than to any foreign policy related issues. As Jokowi made it clear, his priority will be resolving domestic issues first, after which he could concentrate on foreign affairs. As Connelly wisely noted: “Jokowi sees himself primarily as a domestic reformer, not an international statesman. And indeed, the domestic reforms that he has advocated in the areas of infrastructure and the fight against corruption, if executed, would enable economic growth that would allow Indonesia to play a much greater role in world affairs.” [2014:5]

Jokowi’s amazing story – which is compared to Barack Obama’s journey to the White House by Blend - started in 2005, when the former furniture exporter was asked by his fellow businessmen in his hometown of Surakarta to run for mayor. The successful furniture business that he founded in 1988, offered him some advantages. For instance, it often took him overseas to Europe, the United States and Australia, where he inhaled the international business environment, along with the English language. He even managed to send his kids to school in Singapore and Australia. While he became more and more successful in business circles, he also managed to stay out of Jakarta-based business elite with its strong political connections. However, his success in politics - that led him to the presidential palace – was rather due to his fruitful term as a mayor of Surakarta. With its population of 500,000, Surakarta was quite a messy and chaotic town before Jokowi. Due to his famous persistence, he managed to win over even the skeptical bureaucrats for his plans to build public transportation system and clear out slums. His indisputable success as a mayor of Surakarta soon led him to an even greater challenge. After joining Megawati Sukarnoputri’s populist party, the PDI-P, Jokowi was asked to run for the title of Governor of Jakarta. Thus in 2012, Jokowi successfully defeated his opponent and become the governor of Indonesia’s capital city. Yet, his journey was far from an end. Widodo’s growing popularity, both within the PDI-P and outside of Jakarta, made it clear for his party’s leadership that the only reliable candidate who has the potential to win the presidential election and, who could successfully challenge the army’s appointee, Prabowo Subianto, is their rising star, the beloved Jokowi. As it turned out, the former army officer, Lt. General Prabowo Subianto’s well-funded and well-organized campaign was hard to beat in the capital, yet Jokowi managed to outperform him in the rural areas. As a result Joko Widodo – or “Jokowi” as he is known in Indonesia – won the 2014 presidential election and became Indonesia’s seventh President. Nonetheless, for the first time in the country’s history, the
new President was from outside of both the army and the Jakarta-based elite. [Connelly 2014:4-5]

Earlier in 2014, during his presidential campaign, Jokowi replied to criticisms at a business meeting in Jakarta - that targeted his inability to address foreign policy related matters - as follows: “For 24 years, I exported furniture, I may have the face of someone who comes from the village but I have an international brain.” [Blend 2014]. This, combined with the PDI-P nationalist-minded policy and the fact that – as earlier noted – Jokowi’s focus will primarily lie on domestic challenges, will definitely be cause for concerns. Indeed, when Jokowi’s vice-president, Jusuf Kalla released the foreign policy agenda in May 2014, the so-called “Visi-Misi dan Program Aksi” (Vision-Mission and Action Program) in fulfilment of the requirements to register a presidential candidacy, it lacked grand strategies and visions regarding Indonesia’s foreign policy directions. The “visi-misi” program was seen by many experts as a continuous effort to pursue Yudhoyono’s foreign policy agenda. [Parameswaran 2014:157] Yet, it contained four priorities that must be noted:

1. **Promoting Indonesia’s identity as an archipelagic state.** The first tangible sign of Indonesia’s recognition as an archipelagic state is owed to the 1939 Dutch ordinance which meant that the country’s sovereignty had extended only three miles from the low water mark, separating the Indonesian islands from the mainland by international waters. After the independence the Djuanda Declaration of 1957 addressed this issue again and led to the birth of Wawasan Nusantara (Indonesia’s archipelagic doctrine). The Djuanda Declaration allowed Indonesia to extend its territorial water to 12 nautical miles through straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost Indonesian islands. Later, this led to international legal recognition of Indonesia as an archipelagic state under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Today, Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic state which comprises of 17,504 islands with a population of approximately 250 million. Bearing that in mind, the Indonesian obsession to promote the country’s identity as an archipelagic state through diplomacy and international cooperation, is understandable. [Nabbs-Keller 2014:5-6]

2. **Enhancing the global role of middle power diplomacy.** In other words, maintaining Indonesia’s “middlepowermanship” – as Parameswaran puts it – through reinforcing the country’s participation in both global organizations, like
the United Nations or the G20, and regional organizations like ASEAN. Meanwhile, improving bilateral relationships within the Southeast Asian region, as well as in a wider sense, are fundamental basics of the Indonesian agenda to promote the country’s role as a middle power.

3. **Expanding engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.** This means the integration of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as the primary theatre for the Indonesian foreign policy implementation. Doing so, the government seeks to strengthen the regional architecture - especially the East Asia Summit - in order to prevent the hegemony of major powers, as well as managing the impact of regional economic integration and free trade on Indonesia’s national economic interests. In addition, supporting comprehensive maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region through the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), is also one of the government’s priority in this area. [Nabbs-Keller 2014:7-8]

4. **Further reform of the foreign ministry to emphasize economic diplomacy.** This priority may seem as a worn-out phrase that every leader of any given country would emphasize. Yet, taking the fact into account that the Indonesian economy continues to decline from its recent height of 6.5 percent, the promotion of economic diplomacy instantly becomes clear. In addition, Jokowi’s administration also announced the objective to increase the country’s defense budget from 0.8 percent to 1.5 percent of the GDP, which would indicate an enormous effort to redistribute the existing resources more wisely. [Connelly 2014:6]

Beyond these priorities, the “visi-misi” program also emphasizes the so-called “Trisakti”, (the Three Powers) that are: encompassing political sovereignty, economic independence and national character. [Nabbs-Keller 2014:5] However, the implementation of the “visi-misi” program is yet to come, and will face some serious challenges.

During his presidential campaign in the summer of 2014, at a foreign policy debate, Jokowi revealed his most prominent vision regarding the country’s future path in foreign interactions, namely the so-called “poros maritime dunia”, or the “global maritime axis” doctrine. The doctrine – as defined by Nabbs-Keller – “can be understood as an overarching development doctrine, which seeks to augment Indonesia’s prosperity and welfare through economic development of the maritime domain. In essence, the geopolitical component of this broader developmental agenda, calls for a reconceptualization of Indonesia’s vital
interests as an archipelagic state strategically located at the crossroads of contending major power interests in the Indo-Pacific.” [2014:5] In sum, the doctrine predicts Jokowi’s increased focus on maritime commerce within the archipelago, whilst improving Indonesia’s maritime capabilities as well.

Indeed, the “visi-misi” program lacks paramount visions, clear strategies and comprehensive ideas regarding Indonesia’s foreign policy direction. In addition, many experts consider Jokowi’s foreign policy agenda as a sequence of Yudhoyono’s well-established foreign policy with nothing new to offer. Thus the failure to address the newest challenges in the region could be a fatal mistake that could easily lead to severe loss in Indonesia’s prestige and “middlepowermanship”. Consequently, the poorly constructed foreign policy agenda, combined with the fact that Jokowi was new to the practice of international affairs and have showed no particular passion nor sophisticated views on the subject, resulted that by the end of 2014 Indonesia lacked a strong policy-maker - for the first time in ten years – at its apex. [Connelly 2014:6] Additionally, the more and more adverse domestic political environment that requires Jokowi’s full attention, could also result the President’s unwillingness to put more effort into debates regarding the Indonesian foreign policy. Disagreements within its own party and Cabinet could easily lead Indonesia to an impotent foreign policy and the rise of nationalist voices, especially in cases where a full consensus does not emerge due to differences of opinion within the legislature. Further along, as Connelly points it out, it all comes down to two major consequences. Firstly, the Indonesian foreign policy will likely to remain independent and Western-leaning as it was during Yudhoyono’s decade. Yet, whereas in Yudhoyono, Indonesia had a strong-minded leader with a firm view on the country’s place in the world, and with the ability to overrule his advisors from time to time, with Jokowi in the presidential seat, the situation is entirely different. Jokowi’s lack of experience in diplomacy and his unwillingness to engage in internal affairs results in a foreign policy managed case by case. Secondly, due to the current domestic political context of Indonesia, Jokowi, as oppose to his predecessor, will unlikely to be able to overcome differences within his own Cabinet, thus resulting cases where – if consensus not achieved – more nationalist stances will occur on specific issues. As a result, President Jokowi is expected to rely on his key advisors’ opinion with ready-made visions regarding foreign policy related matters. [Connelly 2014:5-6]

To conclude the present chapter by answering the questions raised at beginning, it is safe to say the Jokowi’s personality and personal skills will definitely be a decisive factor of
the Indonesian foreign policy in the future. That being said, it is important to note, that President Jokowi is only at beginning of his five-year term, thus an objective and comprehensive overview – with the possibility of a different conclusion - should be made at the end of his presidency.
5. Goals and challenges of the Indonesian foreign policy

In light of the previous chapter’s findings, I am going to attempt to properly summarize the objectives and challenges of the Indonesian foreign policy. Therefore, this segment of the present paper is devoted to reveal the opportunities and the threats that Jokowi’s administration will have to face in the near future. That being said, it is also important to add that the only reliable source of Jokowi’s view on Indonesia’s future foreign policy is the contradictory “visi-misi” program delivered by Jusuf Kalla in May 2014. As noted earlier, this program – which was released as part of Jokowi’s presidential campaign program – lacks strategic visions and paramount policies in regard with Indonesia’s foreign policy. Yet another difficulty of the “visi-misi” program needs to be addressed, namely the fact that it was written in Indonesian language. Thus making it the primary source of this chapter is impossible. Therefore to overcome this technical difficulty I am going to rely on its English translation, in order to make Jokowi’s view more comprehensible. Bearing that in mind, two important realizations must be re-emphasized again. Firstly, given Jokowi’s inexperience in the field of foreign affairs, the president will most likely rely on his key advisors regarding foreign policy. As a consequence, the Indonesian foreign policy will continue to be independent and Western-leaning, as it was under Yudhoyono. Secondly, as Jokowi himself stated it - before he was elected -, he will focus on domestic issues rather than Indonesia’s international relations. Making the “visi-misi” program the centerpiece of the present chapter, this segment will be divided into two major parts: *Indonesia’s foreign policy goals; threats and challenges.*

5.1. Indonesia’s foreign policy goals

Understanding the country’s foreign policy, first we need to establish its general, yet quite vital strategies and interests regarding Indonesia’s place in the world. First of all, a secure Indonesia. As the world’s largest Muslim-majority state and the third biggest democracy, Indonesia needs to properly address domestic issues and challenges – such as the Islamist extremism and the global threat posed by the Islamic State (IS) for instance – to be able to protect the country’s borders. This achieved, Indonesia would be able to employ proactive measures, with both the capability and willingness to maintain the Indonesian interest in the region. Secondly, creating a safe immediate neighborhood for Indonesia. The security, stability and cohesion of the country’s neighborhood that Indonesia shares with
Australia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, are vital strategic interests. Reinforcing the existing relations, while creating new, wide range of diplomatic, economic and cultural links with those countries, is seen as one of the most problematic issues, considering the long history of territorial disputes between them. Taking the so-called “Konfrontasi” (Confrontation)\textsuperscript{13} between Indonesia and Malaysia during the 1960s for instance, the observation - regarding the neighborhood being problematic – seems quite fair. [Clark 2011:294] Thirdly, the maintenance of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Beyond its immediate neighborhood, Indonesia has a vital interest in the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean. The Southeast Asian region in particular – where Indonesia has a leading role as a “primus inter pares” (first among equals) actor - requires the country’s full attention. Within the region, organizations like ASEAN, the East Asia Summit (EAS) or the Bali Democracy Forum – established by Yudhoyono in 2008 – are seen as key players in fostering peace and cooperation. Furthermore, from an economic point of view, the cohesion of the Southeast Asian region is also crucial for Indonesia. Fourthly, a stable and rules-based global order, in which Indonesia can more actively engage in international affairs, is also one of the most important interests of the country. Playing a more active role in global organizations, such as the United Nations, the G20 or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) would help to preserve an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other, and can effectively manage other risks and threats, like terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.

Having conceptualized Indonesia’s general foreign policy interests, for further details we must direct our attention to the “visi-misi” program that offers some specification. As it was noted earlier, the 41-page document presents four pillars of priorities: the commitment to prioritize Indonesia’s identity as an archipelagic state; increased global role through middle-power diplomacy; expanding engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, which covers countries along the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean; the formulation and implementation of foreign policies based on public participation. [Aritonang and Witular

\textsuperscript{13}The territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia occurred in the 1960s, over Kuala Lumpur’s planned incorporation of the Borneo territories into a new Federation of Malaysia, known as “Greater Malaysia”. Sukarno saw the proposed creation of Greater Malaysia as a challenge to Indonesia’s regional leadership. The creation of Malaysia became the basis of for Indonesia’s three-year campaign to destroy Malaysia that included a series of confrontational policies and actions.
Through the following section, I am going to investigate each of these priorities by discussing them one by one.

5.1.1. Committing to prioritize Indonesia’s identity as an archipelagic state

- Engage in maritime diplomacy to accelerate the settlement of border issues with ten neighboring countries.
- Ensure Indonesia’s territorial integrity.
- Secure natural resources and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).
- Intensify defense diplomacy.
- Ease maritime rivalries between major nations and promote territorial dispute settlements. [Aritonang and Witular 2014]

As pointed out in the previous chapter, Jokowi made the new maritime doctrine the basis of the county’s future foreign policy. Emphasis given to maritime related issues, however, the doctrine also has a broader effect on both defense and security policy, thus reaching beyond its operational framework. According to this overreaching concept, the Jokowi administration will seek to increase the welfare and prosperity of Indonesia by securing economic development of the maritime domain. Yet, considering the fact that Indonesia is located at the crossroads of contending major power interests, the increased commitment to prioritize the country’s identity as an archipelagic state, combined with Jokowi’s intent to raise maritime capabilities, is highly problematic. [Nabbs-Keller 2014:5]

Another important addition to the above listed priorities regarding Indonesia’s archipelagic status - which was recognized under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – is the so-called “EEZ” or the Exclusive Economic Zones. These sea zones were established by the same convention, the UNCLOS which describes the EEZ as special water based territory, over which the given nation has unique rights in regard with exploration and the use of maritime resources. In addition, the EEZ stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles from its coast line. [UN 2015] In spite of the recognition of its archipelagic status in international law, Indonesia has never seemed to either appreciate or incorporate it into its foreign policy agenda. The lack of Indonesia’s focus on maritime policy is much owed to the Suharto regime’s preoccupation with the country’s domestic challenges, which indicated the fast development of the Indonesian Army at the expense of the Navy and Air Force. In terms of necessity of a conceptualized maritime doctrine, I am convinced that Jokowi’s “global maritime axis” concept was highly
expected, especially in light of the fact that “Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic state”, that “comprises of 17,504 islands with a population of approximately 250 million.” [Nabbs-Keller 2014:6]

Furthermore, the reorientation of Indonesia’s defense and foreign policy planning, in accordance with Jokowi’s maritime axis concept, is an expression of the country’s newly recognized geo-strategic interests. The reason behind the search for greater authority is the previously mentioned “Trisakti” (the three powers), according to which the Jokowi administration will focus on encompassing political sovereignty, economic independence and national character. [Nabbs-Keller 2014:7]

The president faces huge implementational challenges of the maritime doctrine considering the ongoing South China Sea debate for instance, in which Indonesia’s mediator role – at least under President Yudhoyono – is seen as a cornerstone in maintaining the peaceful outcome of the dispute between China and ASEAN member states. But more about this particular matter later. What is important for us is the financial side of the story. The implementation of the “global maritime axis” will require long term investment, which will not be realized within Jokowi’s five-year term. In addition, in light of Indonesia’s current economic downturn – due to poor infrastructural background and shortcomings in educational, health and agricultural systems – Jokowi’s expressed intent to raise the defense budget in order to develop the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) is highly problematic. To conclude the current segment, I am going to rely on Greta Nabbs-Keller’s observation: “Whilst Indonesia remains unable to police its expansive territorial waters it remains prone to myriad security threats and criminal activities including arms, drugs and people smuggling, piracy, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and territorial violations by state actors. [2014:11]

5.1.2. Increasing global role through middle-power diplomacy

- Develop the capacity to ensure the safety of Indonesians overseas.
- Prioritize the protection of Indonesian migrant workers.
- Promote multilateral cooperation in the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
- Promote a balance and relevant cooperation at the G-20.
• Engage actively in conflict resolution and peace-keeping. [Aritonang and Witular 2014]

As we can see, these foreign policy objectives are general and apply for basically every country in the region. Yet, this general approach – which has long been criticized by many experts – requires additional fine tuning. In addition, this segment of the “vivi-misi” program has the most tangible sign of President Yudhoyono’s legacy, since Indonesia’s elevated role as a middle power and a more activist approach in engaging foreign affairs are owed to him. For instance, championing Indonesia’s role in multilateral groupings, like the East Asia Summit (EAS), the G20, the United Nations or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), were seen definitely as successes. Yudhoyono also emphasized the Islamic and democratic credentials of Indonesia. By showing keen interest in matters regarding the Muslim world – for instance the Israel-Palestine peace process or the Rohingya Muslims’ situation in Myanmar – Yudhoyono managed to express Indonesia’s solidarity with Muslim states. In spite of the country’s limited influence in these matters, Yudhoyono also started the so-called Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), which was a governmental initiative – established in 2008 – that allowed Indonesia to share its experiences of democratization with other Muslim states and vice-versa. Despite the fact that the BDF lacks of a proper decision-making body, and has been criticized as being another talk shop, these initiatives proved Indonesia’s desire to become a more prominent player in world affairs. [Sambhi 2014:26-28] In sum, Jokowi inherited Yudhoyono’s view on Indonesia’s place in the world and this particular segment of the “visi-misi” program is a reflection of that. Yet, the most important question still remains: will Jokowi be able to continuously maintain Indonesia’s increased global role?

5.1.3. Expand engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, which covers countries along the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean

• Consolidate leadership in ASEAN.
• Strengthen ASEAN cooperation.
• Strengthen regional architecture, particularly of the East Asia Summit.
• Push for regional maritime cooperation, particularly through the Indian Ocean Rim Association. [Aritonang and Witular 2014]

Indonesia’s traditional “non-alignment” approach resulted that with a few brief exceptions in its history, the country has never committed itself to any major power. Instead,
Indonesia has always worked in multilateral groupings, where no power is dominant and where all parties can mutually benefit from a peaceful cooperation. However, balancing between the United States and China for instance, especially with China becoming more aggressive towards Southeast Asian states is a lot harder than one would think. As Sambhi puts it: “Widodo will have to walk a fine line between securing Indonesia’s strategic interests and maintaining strong economic cooperation with China. [2014:34] In addition, ASEAN could be the key for that. Therefore, reinforcing Indonesia’s historical “primus inter pares” role within ASEAN should be one of Jokowi’s main foreign policy objectives. Indeed, despite accusations of being simply a talk shop, ASEAN still seems to be an important forum to discuss the Southeast Asian region’s economic, security and political issues. With a remarkable average annual GDP growth of 6 percent since 2004 and aggregate GDP responsible for 3.3 percent of the world’s total, ASEAN showed an impressive economic success. [Sambhi 2014:34, Rattanasevee 2014:113-127] Yet, aside from its undeniable economic success, the organization has failed to become a forum of political and diplomatic discourse regarding the South China Sea debate. Jokowi’s expressed intent to strengthen the cooperation within ASEAN – considering Indonesia’s mediator role in this debate - is understandable. Furthermore, the success of these multilateral groupings in the Southeast Asian region could be a good example for a wider region, the Indo-Pacific region in particular. In spite of its shortcomings, the Jokowi administration will try to find the common ground within the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to successfully promote the new Indonesian maritime doctrine.

5.1.4. Formulate and implement foreign policies based on public participation.

- Reorganize the Foreign Ministry.
- Promote specialization among diplomats in the fields of asset recovery, law of the sea and strategic research. [Aritonang and Witular 2014]

Reforming the Foreign Ministry was a hallmark of Yudhoyono’s tenure. While he managed to increase the civilian influence in the army-dominated Foreign Ministry, Yudhoyono successfully toned down the institutional oppositions within the Indonesian legislative framework. As a result, the new Foreign Ministry became more professional and more transparent than ever. Not surprisingly, Jokowi’s intention to keep up with his predecessor’s major reforms is also a cornerstone of the “visi-misi” program. Indeed, reducing the number of ministries, deputys and political positions within his own cabinet, Jokowi managed to maintain the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the only ministry with a
By rethinking the operational framework of the Indonesian foreign policy, Jokowi will have the opportunity to address the most recent challenges. As pointed out by the present segment of the “visi-misi” program, economic development is definitely one of the most urgent challenges that Indonesia will have to face in the near future. Rizal Sukma - the most prominent foreign policy advisor to the Jokowi Government – describes the strong link between diplomacy and economy as the following: “You can’t eat an international image. The key focus is to use diplomacy for economic benefit”. [Cochrane 2014] Furthermore, Indonesia’s economic growth is a basic ingredient of many domestic issues, like creating more jobs, reducing the gap in income inequality or increasing the available revenue that could cover the educational, health and infrastructural expenses. In addition, maintaining economic growth is also crucially needed in terms of the military modernization. [Sambhi 2014:37]

5.1.5. The realm of defense and security

In terms of defense:

- Allocate 1.5 percent of GDP for defense budget within five years.
- Reduce imports by developing domestic defense industry.
- Develop the Navy into a respected regional force.
- Set up a National Security Council. [Aritonang and Witular 2014]

In terms of security:

- Improve discipline within the police force.
- Adjust police education and training to produce officers with civilian mind-set.
- Revise regulations governing the police force.
- Separate the police authorities to make and implement policies.
- Empower the National Police Commission (Kompolnas) to be a watchdog over the police force. [Aritonang and Witular 2014]

As general as they are, these segments of the “visi-misi” program offers us some specifications in regard with Indonesia’s future defense and security policy. In terms of defense, Jokowi’s new “maritime axis” doctrine requires the development of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) into a regional naval power. Accordingly, the new government will have to look beyond Yodhoyono’s so-called Minimum Essential Force (MEF) 2024 strategy,
which was seen as a “capability-based defence and force readiness level that can guarantee the attainment of immediate strategic defence interests.” [Nabbs-Keller 2014:9] In addition, the “vivi-misi” program also emphasizes the fact, that in order to achieve this ambitious and comprehensive military reform, the government will increase the defense budget from the previous 0.82 percent of the GDP to 1.5 percent of the GDP. In terms of security, it may seem odd, that emphasis was given mostly to the police force and its institutional reform. Yet, in light of the deep institutional rivalry between the TNI and the Police (Polri) ever since their separation in 1999, it safe to say that the cultural differences within the Indonesian security bureaucracies requires the new government’s full attention. As Nabbs-Keller puts it: the country’s security bureaucracies are far “from internalising the good governance principles of efficient service delivery, transparency and accountability.” [2014:10] Furthermore, the latest sign of Jokowi’s intention to upgrade the Navy and use it for deterrence, is the so-called “sink the vessels” policy. According to this new policy, the Indonesian Navy has the authority to publicly sink any illegal fishing vessel operating in Indonesian waters. The tough Indonesian approach was a response to the intolerable situation “where over 5,000 ships operate illegally in its waters every day, making a mockery out of Indonesian sovereignty and resulting in annual losses of over $20 billion.” [Parameswaran 2015]

Having discussed the “visi-misi” program in details - ironic as it may seem, considering its generality – now let us direct our focus towards another important foreign policy objective, namely the Jokowi Government’s intention to improve bilateral relations. Doing so, I will focus on three countries in particular, given their credentials in regard with geo-politics, economy, and military. These are the United States, China and India.

5.1.6. Indonesia-US relations

From a historical point of view, ever since Indonesia’s independence, the relationship with the United States can be best described as wavering, often cool, sometimes even antagonistic. However, after a bitter start, by the early 1970s the Suharto regime changed its attitude towards Washington and introduced a western-oriented foreign policy, in which the United States had a prominent role to play. For the next twenty years both Jakarta and Washington hugely benefited from this prosperous cooperation. Yet, as it was noted in the previous chapters, during the 1990s Indonesia’s aggressive approach towards East Timor resulted in counter-measures from the United States. Consequently, in 1999, President Clinton went as far as banning all the military contracts with Jakarta due to the violence that
came with the East Timorese independence referendum. In spite of its shortcomings, the relation seemed to consolidate during the early 2000s, especially after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, and Indonesia’s expressed intent to support the “Global War on Terror”. As the world’s largest Muslim-majority state, Indonesia’s allegiance was seen by President George W. Bush as an extraordinary opportunity to build partnership with Jakarta based on mutual security interests. In terms of military relations, the connection between Washington and Jakarta improved drastically, following the 2004 Aceh earthquake and tsunami, when the United States provided Indonesia with humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, in 2004, Washington lifted the military arms restrictions. [Mendiolaza and Hardjakusuma 2014]

Given Yudhoyono’s personal affection with the United States, during his second term, the relations between the two countries became even more prosperous. With emphasis given to cultural goods, in 2011, Washington launched the first Public Democracy Outreach Centre which was located at embassy in Jakarta. Later that year, with the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, Jakarta’s importance was emphasized again by Washington. This initiative concentrated on a wide range of issues, from trade and investment to security and defense. Bearing that in mind, Jokowi’s effort to keep the United States interested in the Indonesian market, would be the right thing to do. Companies from the United States are famous for their aggressive approach towards Asian economies. That, combined with the fact that the Indonesian market has a continuously increasing consumer base as well as a growing income levels, could indicate a mutually beneficial arrangement for both of them. [Mendiolaza and Hardjakusuma 2014] Furthermore, with Jokowi increasing the defense budget, a good opportunity revealed itself for Washington, to put more effort in major arms deals with Indonesia. In sum, the wavering relationship between Washington and Jakarta can be mutually beneficial from an economic, military and even a cultural point of view. That being said, maintaining and improving this bilateral tie must be among Jokowi’s foreign policy priorities.

5.1.7. Indonesia-China relations

Chinese had long been a resident of the Indonesian archipelago. The presence of Chinese traders, as early as the second and third centuries, was not unknown for Indonesians. Centuries later, after Indonesia had gained its independence, the relations between China and Indonesia were suspended in 1969. It was Suharto who later resumed this tie. In addition, due to Suharto’s lack of interest in building an active and productive relation with Beijing,
until the president’s historical resignation in 1998, there was not a real partnership between China and Indonesia. Using the words of Mendiolaza and Hardjakusuma to describe the connection between China and Indonesia, it is “one of persistent ambivalence”. Once Jakarta realized the importance of the twenty-first century’s fastest growing economy, the nature of their relation changed dramatically. With Jakarta’s more welcoming attitude towards China’s engagement in the region, an indirect connection between them were established through ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Bearing in mind that Indonesia was originally against a direct political relation with Beijing, Jakarta welcomed the possibility of a future economic cooperation. As a result, Indonesia declared a strategic partnership with Beijing in 2005. In addition, Indonesia also supported initiatives like ASEAN Plus Three or EAS through which China could further expand its engagement in the Southeast Asian region. As the ties between Indonesia and China grew stronger, their cooperation expanded to include defense technology, trade, investment and education. [Mendiolaza and Hardjakusuma 2014, Garnaut 2015:189-212]

In 2011, Beijing and Jakarta signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding defense matters. According to this agreement, an improved military cooperation - with emphasis given to technology transfer, equipment, joint trainings, counter-terrorism and official visits – was seen as a key point of their relation. From the Chinese point of view, having a close ally that is partly in control of the Malacca Strait, – a major economic route in the region with strategic importance – is crucial in terms of safeguarding China’s trade and energy import. From the Indonesian point of view, relying on multiple defense suppliers, especially in light of the arms embargos of 1990s, China could be the solution. In addition, both Yudhoyono’s “Minimum Essential Force 2024” strategy and later Jokowi’s “global maritime axis” doctrine recognized China as one of Indonesia’s most prominent strategic partner. Whether due to geography or economic considerations, it is safe to say that China will remain Indonesia’s key partner in the future. In terms of the South China Sea debate, Jokowi’s most challenging task ahead of him will be the continuous maintenance of Indonesia’s mediator role between China and ASEAN member states. [Mendiolaza and Hardjakusuma 2014, Chen 2014:78-82]

14This initiative includes all ASEAN members, plus People's Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea
5.1.8. Indonesia-India relations

With its longest-standing relations with Indonesia – as noted in previous chapters – India has always been a prominent partner of Jakarta. Cultural, religious, political, economic and social exchange for hundreds of years was nothing out of ordinary between them. Not surprisingly, in 1950 Sukarno was invited as a guest of honour to India’s ceremony of independence. Furthermore, close, historical ties and the fact that both country shared colonial experiences, resulted the establishment of the famous Non-Alignment Movement, with both Sukarno and Jawaharlal Nehru as founding fathers. However, during Suharto’s New Order era, the relations between them were suspended, due to Indonesia’s Western-leaning foreign policy. In addition, Suharto’s hostile attitude towards both India and China was owed to their allegiance with the Soviet Union. Again, after Suharto’s resignation, the relations with India were resumed. [Mendiolaza and Hardjakusuma 2014]

Over the past decade, the prosperous cooperation between them resulted significant economic growth on both sides. Furthermore, the two emerging market economies are both members of the G20. Additionally, aside from similarities in terms of their economy, they are also experiencing almost identical domestic issues, like corruption, inadequate bureaucracies, mass poverty and terrorism, just to mention a few. Having recognized India’s importance again, Yudhoyono initiated a Strategic Partnership with the country in 2005. As a result, there was a massive growth in bilateral trade “from US $6.2 billion in 2006 to US $16.2 billion in 2011.” [Mendiolaza and Hardjakusuma 2014] In addition, much of this huge economic growth was owed to military trades between India and Indonesia. For Jokowi to understand the essence of the Indian-Indonesian relations, addressing the region’s future challenges is inevitable. In doing so, Indonesia must come to terms with its place in the region, considering the fact that the country is geographically positioned between China and India. However, the increased rivalry between India and China, combined with Indonesia’s role as a guardian of the Malacca Strait means that both of the major powers have vital interest in the maintenance of Indonesia’s stability. [Mendiolaza and Hardjakusuma 2014, Chen 85-87]

Having discussed Indonesia’s foreign policy goals back and forth, paying crucial attention to the much-criticized “visi-misi” program, now let us move on the final segment of the present chapter, namely the challenges that President Jokowi will have to face in the near future.
5.2. Threats and challenges

What lays ahead of President Jokowi’s Indonesia? Is it going to be an easy five-year term? The answer to that particular question is a definite no, considering the more and more challenging atmosphere of the archipelagic state both domestically and internationally. Whilst maintaining Indonesia’s middle power image, Mr. Widodo has to tackle with some major domestic issues at home. Impossible as it may seem, through the present segment of the chapter, I am going to attempt to summarize the most important implementational challenges of Jokowi’s foreign policy. Moving from general issues to more specific cases, exclusive attention will be given to the South China Sea debate in particular. Yet before moving further along, two major challenges must be addressed at this point, especially in light of the previous chapters. Firstly, Jokowi’s well-known personal attitude towards foreign policy, combined with his lack of experience in international relations. Secondly, President Jokowi’s hostile environment within the Cabinet, which makes any foreign policy implementation nearly impossible. That being said, let us take a look at challenges in general.

Firstly, as noted earlier, one of the most prominent challenge that Widodo has to face in the near future, is Indonesia’s financial situation. In other words: if Jokowi cannot control the gap between Indonesia’s objectives and the limited budget that the country has to tackle them, then the whole “visi-misi” program will indeed remain just a vision. Furthermore, financial insufficiency in regard with Jokowi’s planned army modernization and defense budget raise could also lead to major implementational problems with the “global maritime axis” doctrine. Considering the problems arising from illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, illegal border crossing, migration and drug trafficking, – just to mention a few water-related challenges – the failure of the Navy’s modernization could came at a huge price. Therefore, a wiser and more creative way to re-allocate Indonesia’s resources is definitely needed. [Parameswaran 2014:157]

Secondly, the challenge of Indonesia’s rising nationalism. The increasing level of nationalist voices is definitely one of the oldest and most problematic areas of the Indonesian society, which – if not addressed and managed well – could destroy the country’s prospects. In terms of foreign policy, the rising number of cases where Indonesia took a more nationalist stance could also give us reasons for concern. The situation is even more complex than one would think, considering the fact that while Jokowi must deliver some firm and nationalist-minded foreign policy decisions – required of him by his own Cabinet and party –, he must
also fight the potential damage to Indonesia’s global reputation caused by the constantly rising nationalism. In light of illegal fishing and the ongoing territorial disputes with neighboring countries, overcoming nationalistic passions will be even harder. [Parameswaran 2014:158]

Thirdly, maintaining and improving Indonesia’s democratic and human rights related credentials is also a crucially painful challenge laying ahead the Jokowi administration. Continuous human rights violations, such as the curtailment of rights and freedoms of minorities by hardline Islamic groups, high level of child labour or uninhabitable environments in some regions, would deserve more of Jokowi’s attention. Working closer with the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) – established in 2009 – could be a solution to this problem. Sharing experiences with like-minded nations in the region as well as receiving official complaints and having on-sites visits could successfully promote importance of human rights. Again, Indonesia’s international credibility is at stake here. If the world’s third biggest democracy – a fact that Indonesia is overly proud of – cannot improve nor maintain its democratic and human rights related credentials, then initiatives like the Bali Democracy Forum are nothing but empty gestures. [Parameswaran 2014:159]

Fourthly, the more and more disturbing Islam extremism. Indonesia - as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country - is increasingly affected by this global phenomenon that poses huge challenges to the country’s national and regional counter-terrorism efforts. The phenomenon represented mainly by the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), could easily revitalize radical Salafist groupings in Indonesia, while potentially erode the country’s social cohesion. However, taking the previously mentioned Darul Islam concept into account, the challenge of religious extremism is not new for the country. As Greta Nabbs-Keller wisely notes it: “The 2001 September 11 attacks on the United States, combined with deadly sectarian violence in Indonesia’s Maluku and Sulawesi provinces in the early years of Indonesia’s democratic transition, gave rise to the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).” [2014:16] This is the organization responsible for the famous Bali night clubs bombings of 2002, which resulted the death of hundreds of Indonesian and other foreign individuals. Countermeasures has been taken by the Indonesian Government ever since, including the increased supervision of social media and deradicalization programs. In addition, one of the most dangerous organizations that currently operates in the country, is the Sulawesi-based terrorist network, the Eastern Indonesia Mujahidin (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT).
President Jokowi disregards religious extremism and terrorist groups, then his famous and much-hyped Indonesian model – which is based on the country’s success in the peaceful co-existence of Islam, democracy and modernity – could lose its validity. [Nabbs-Keller 2014:15-17, Parameswaran 2015]

Lastly, the attitude towards ASEAN. Given the fact, that Indonesia has worked closely with the organization for more than fifty years, it may seem odd to call this prosperous cooperation challenging. However, Jokowi’s domestic-oriented and bilateral foreign policy – as it has been criticized – tends to put more emphasis on a wider, Indo-Pacific region. [Parameswaran 2014] That combined with the growing tension between Indonesia and non-democratic ASEAN member states due to “Indonesia’s forward-leaning measures” – as Parameswaran put it – could result in a more hostile atmosphere within the organization. [2014:159] Yet, as it was noted above, the “visi-misi” program dedicates a whole chapter to ASEAN including priorities like strengthening and improving the ties with the organization, whilst reinforcing Indonesia’s leading role. Therefore, despite the growing frustration among the Indonesian elite towards the organization’s shortcomings, Jokowi must not let himself to be affected by these disputes. Given the ongoing South China Sea debate and the issue of illegal fishing it may very well be a challenging task indeed.

5.2.1. The South China Sea debate

There is a broad agreement among experts on the fact that Jokowi’s most significant foreign policy challenge – that he inherited from Yudhoyono – will be the much-hyped South China Sea debate which started in 2009. China’s aggressive approach towards the region in question, resulted in huge tension between Beijing, Taiwan, Japan and four ASEAN claimant states, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. As the dispute evolved, Indonesia became a mediator between China and the ASEAN claimants fulfilling Yudhoyono’s dream that the country is ready to act like a regional leader. In addition to that, Indonesia has to solve its own tension with China, since its EEZ – located north of the Natuna Islands, in Riau Islands Province – seems to be intersecting with Chinese claims. Still, Indonesia can be considered as lucky since the country only has to protect its waters, whereas the other ASEAN claimants have a lot more to lose, including entire islands. Ever since, threats from both sides’ law enforcement vessels towards each other’s fishing vessels has been initiated almost on a daily basis. Furthermore, with Jokowi’s earlier noted “sink the vessels” policy, the situation became even more tense, making sinking ships a common sight in those waters. [Connelly 2014:10-11, Nabbs-Keller 2014:12, Parameswaran 2014:160]
The core of the problem are the competing territorial claims over South China Sea and its islands that every participants claims to be theirs on several different basis. In addition, given the importance of natural resources in these waters – oil and natural gas in particular – the dispute has a significant financial side as well. In theory, a country’s well-established EEZ means that the given country has special rights – including the exploitation of natural resources – over the particular territory. Yet, in practice, the situation is entirely different, taking for instance China’s assertive approach towards the Spratly Islands and Vietnam’s EEZ into account. The latter resulted China’s unilateral erection of a deep water oil drilling rig in Vietnam’s EEZ between May and July 2014. Furthermore, another important economic dimension of the ongoing South China Sea debate are the major maritime trade routes in the area that makes the territory in question one of the busiest place on Earth regarding commercial shipping traffic. There is a lot to be gained from an established control over specific islands and waters in the region, thus competing major powers – such as India, Japan and China – adds more pressure to the ongoing debate. However, in spite of the continuous diplomatic – and sometimes military – efforts, so far the issue has not been resolved. As a result, the South China Sea debate remains the most prominent source of conflict in the region.

Trying to keep the debate within the frameworks provided by the international law, in 2010, Indonesia questioned the legality of the Chinese claims towards the waters of Natuna Islands described by Beijing as its own “territorial waters”. So far no response has been received.

This ongoing debate revealed another important shortcoming that must be noted, namely the institutional disagreement between the Foreign Ministry and the army. On the one hand, diplomats and officials of the Foreign Ministry seem to continuously pursue the slow diplomatic channels with no tangible result on the horizon. As Connelly noted it: the foreign ministry’s practice has been to downplay tensions rather than allow them to complicate its efforts to facilitate dialogue among the claimant states. [2014:11] On the other hand, officers of the TNI represent a more pragmatic approach by demanding immediate military counter-measures in the maintenance of Indonesia’s strategic interests. Few high-ranking naval officers – with disregarding every rule – went even further, and publicly criticized the government for being ignorant towards the army’s proposal thus risking Indonesian lives. Therefore President Jokowi must handle the tension between the two
institutions in order to avoid adding another crucial threat to the already long list of challenges.

As we can see the complexity of this challenge, while a more nationalist stance could easily trigger military measures and a possible war, ignoring these issues could lead to both territorial and prestige losses. So far, it seems that President Jokowi sides with the nationalist concept, especially in light of his vessel sinking policy. Yet, it is important to emphasize again, that the president must remain calm and clear-headed while he must not let himself carried away by nationalist passions. In addition, if Indonesia, a non-claimant participant, wants to play the role of “honest broker” in the debate – as Jokowi himself put it – the country will have to remain impartial. [Parameswaran 2015]

To conclude the present segment, it is safe to say that there is a long road ahead of President Jokowi which will be anything but easy. Considering Indonesia’s financial difficulties, the rising level of nationalism, the South China Sea debate or the countless other challenges that fall beyond the scope of the present paper, Jokowi’s five-year term will be quite challenging indeed.
6. Conclusion

To conclude my findings, thus proving the validity of my hypothesis, first let us take a good look on what has been discussed so far. After establishing the theoretical framework of the present paper – provided by the discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and its actor-specific theories in particular – I introduced Indonesia’s history in a compact, yet quite brief way. Doing so, I focused on the country’s historical developments from the Dutch colonial rule to Yudhoyono’s election.

With emphasis given to the past sixty years, I also investigated the most prominent developments in the Indonesian foreign policy in details. After gaining independence, the country started out as a liberal democracy with a multi-party parliamentary system and a Western-oriented foreign policy. Indonesia’s Western-leaning concept during Sukarno’s first decade in power is mainly owed to decolonization efforts, in which Western countries and organizations – such as the United Nations and the United States in particular – were seen as instruments in maintaining the country’s hard-fought independence. However, by the late 1950s, after the famous Bandung Conference of 1955, this concept had changed drastically due to Sukarno’s recognition of Western-style democracy as an approach unfitting Indonesia. Flirting with the Soviet Union and China during the 1960s was the most visible sign of Indonesia’s wavering relationship with western countries. Yet, it is important to give some credit to Suharto’s New Order era – in spite of all its shortcomings regarding corruption, nepotism and authoritarianism – for its focus on regional cooperation and for the restoration of Western relations. After two failed attempts – the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and the MAPHILINDO – in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established. With its headquarter located in the Indonesian capital city, Jakarta, ASEAN was highly promoted by General Suharto’s insular system. It was not until the late 1980s that the Indonesian political elite challenged Suharto’s devotion toward ASEAN. Indeed, the failure of ASEAN to foster peace in the region and to resolve territorial disputes between the member states resulted Indonesia’s waning faith in the organization. After the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the historical resignation of Suharto, weak leaders followed, trying to fulfill the void left by firm and strong-minded rulers, such as Sukarno or Suharto.
In 2004, by winning the first ever direct presidential elections, Yudhoyono came to office. There seems to be a broad agreement on the perception of Yudhoyono’s tenure of office, for it is seen as an era of stability and firm foreign policy. Experience in foreign affairs and seniority within the Indonesian army offered Yudhoyono the ability to reconceptualize the country’s outdated foreign policy. Doing so, he came up with the so-called “a million friends and zero enemies” concept. During his ten years in office, Yudhoyono proved to be a true international statesmen with both the ability and willingness to reform the architecture of the Indonesian foreign policy. As a result, Indonesia was elevated to a middle power status, with a leading role in the Southeast Asian region and capacity to employ proactive diplomacy on a global scale. It was in this political context that – in October, 2014 – Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, the first ever president from outside of the army and the Jakarta-based political elite, was elected. However, as opposed to his predecessor, Jokowi’s lack of political experience – considering the fact that the former furniture exporter is new to the world of diplomacy – was seen by many experts as cause for concern. That, combined with Jokowi’s expressed intent to pay more attention to domestic issues rather than to foreign policy, will likely cause some damage to Indonesia’s middle power status as I argue in this paper. However, for the first time in ten years, Indonesia seems to be lacking paramount visions and clear strategies regarding its foreign policy.

Given all that, in the present paper I further argued that without clear views on Indonesia’s place in the world, Jokowi’s election could came at a crucial price. Thus the answer to the first question – raised at beginning of this paper – is that Jokowi’s personality and personal skills will definitely be a decisive factor in the country’s future foreign policy. In addition to that, until Jokowi comes to terms with the current atmosphere of international politics, he is going to be likely to rely on his key advisors.

Furthermore, to answer the second question of this paper, I investigated Indonesia’s most prominent foreign policy goals. Doing so, I made Jokowi’s “visi-misi” (vision and mission) program the centerpiece of my analysis, for it is the only available official summary so far that summarizes – more or less – the government’s view on foreign policy. The 41-page document had been the object of countless criticisms mostly in regard with its generality. According to the “visi-misi” program the new president’s foreign policy will be based on four pillars of priorities:

- Committing to prioritize Indonesia’s identity as an archipelagic state
Increasing Indonesia’s global role through middle-power diplomacy
Expanding engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, which covers countries along the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean
Formulating and implementing foreign policies based on public participation

In sum, Indonesia’s foreign policy continues to be independent and Western-leaning, as it was under Yudhoyono. While Jokowi improves bilateral ties with major powers – such as the United States, China, India or Japan – and neighboring countries, the president also seeks to advance Indonesia’s “primus inter pares” role within the architecture of the ASEAN.

By addressing the most prominent implementational challenges of Jokowi’s foreign policy, - much of which he inherited from his predecessor – I am going to provide the answer to the third question of this paper. These challenges includes a wide range of areas stretching from financial shortcomings of the Indonesian economy to nationalism and from human rights violations to the problems with the ASEAN. One of the most burning challenges ahead of Jokowi is the rising religious extremism in Indonesia. Given the fact the creation of the Islamic State (IS) revitalized many terrorist groups across the archipelagic state – the most dangerous one is the Sulawesi-based terrorist network, the Eastern Indonesia Mujahidin (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT) – President Jokowi has to be more than careful in handling the situation, since Indonesia’s social cohesion and country’s hard-fought democratic prestige is at stake. Furthermore, the ongoing South China Sea debate adds another major threat to the long list challenges. With Indonesia being a non-claimant participant in the debate, Jokowi wants to continuously maintain the country’s mediator role, as did Yudhoyono. Yet, considering the new president’s more nationalist stance on foreign policy, so far it seems this “honest broker” role – as Jokowi referred to it – is out of reach.

The hypothesis presented in this paper was that ‘if Jokowi fails to properly address and manage Indonesia’s most burning challenges – due to his lack of experience in diplomacy or the country’s rising nationalist passion – then the archipelagic state will likely experience some losses of its hard-fought prestige and credibility both regionally and globally.’

Given all my previously mentioned findings - in regard with Jokowi’s lack of political experience and the Indonesia’s foreign policy goals and challenges – I am convinced that there already are some signs of the country’s loss of prestige. Among the most apparent of them is President Jokowi’s so-called “sink the vessels” policy which aims
to sink any illegal fishing vessel operating in Indonesian waters. This policy is a perfect example of not just a case where Widodo let himself be carried away by nationalist passion in the very significant matter of illegal fishing, but also of the fact that the country had suffered severe loss of prestige, considering the fact that Jokowi had to awkwardly explain and defend his concept several times during his presidential visit to Japan or the United States for instance. Given all the arguments presented here, the basis of my hypothesis remains valid. Yet, in all fairness, a proper and objective overview – with the possibility of a different conclusion - should be made at the end of Jokowi’s presidency considering the fact that he is only at beginning of his five-year term.
7. Bibliography

Books:


Articles, journals and periodicals


[Retrieved: 10/11/2015]


[Retrieved: 14/10/2015]


[Retrieved: 02/11/2015]


Parameswaran, Prashanth (2015): The Trouble with Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Priorities Under Jokowi, *The Diplomat*, [ONLINE] Available at:


Electronic sources


Webpage of the Indian Ocean RIM Association: Available at:  http://www.iora.net/  
[Retrieved: 07/11/2015]

**Strategic papers**

Defence White Paper 2009 of Australia,  [ONLINE] Available at:  
[Retrieved: 04/11/2015]
8. Clause

I the undersigned, Márton Fenyő (ID number: 606688RA) candidate for the M.A. degree in International Studies declare herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of others, and no part of the thesis infringes on any person’s or institute’s copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

Budapest, 15 November 2015

Márton Fenyő

Alulírott Fenyő Márton (Szig.: 606688RA) nyilatkozom arról, hogy a szakdolgozat saját szellemi termékem, azt más szakon szakdolgozatként nem nyújtottam be, és csak a megjelölt segédeszközöket használtam.


Fenyő Márton