Research Proposal
Theme:
Platonic Theories of the Soul in Late Antiquity and Their Influence on the Early Modern Age

Platonism involves a radical dualism between soul and body. Radical in the sense that it does not only insist on the separability of the two, but also claims that the nature of the soul is utterly different from the body. It is incorporeal altogether. Two major problems have remained unsettled. /1/ If the soul is incorporeal altogether, does that mean that it is indivisible as well? /2/ If the soul is incorporeal, how shall we explain the interaction between body and soul in human beings?
The question concerning indivisibility puzzled Plato as well, and he gave at least two different answers. In the Phaedo he argues that the soul is as indivisible as possible since it is akin to the ideas that are indivisible in an unqualified way. In the Republic, however, he seems to say that the soul divides into three motivational units, called appetite, spirit and reason. The threefold division shows up in the Timaeus, with the additional point that they are divided not only functionally but also spatially; the seat of reason is the head, spirit is around the heart and appetite resides around the liver. The picture implies that, although immaterial, the soul is endowed with spatial extension insofar as it is located at different parts of the body. In the Platonic tradition indivisibility has been tied to the question of the parts of the soul. As indivisibility involves immortality since only what is divisible can disintegrate, the answer to this question inevitably determines these authors thought about the fate of the discarnate soul.  In a way, Platonists share Aristotle’s queries who, as is well known, repeatedly mentions the possibility that the intellect is separated from the rest of the soul, but the precise way of its separations was left without further investigation. As we know it from Damascius, the head of the Platonist school in early sixth century, there was a dispute about which part of the soul survives the death of compound (of body and soul). As many philosophers in late antiquity tried to combine the notion of the parts of the soul with the basic doctrine of the separability of the soul, we must be clear about what kind of divisibility they had in mind. For instance, when, discussing Aristotle’s views on active intellect, pseudo-Philoponus claims (CAG XV, 550.7-8) that human intellect (nous) thinks indivisibly whereas reason (dianoia) knows each individual things divisibly and separately, it seems that he distinguishes two rational capacity on the basis of their handling with their objects. Furthermore, one of these capacities apprehends its objects divisibly and separately, which clearly indicates that we have to ascribe divisibility both in function and in content to the rational faculty; it consists of two capacities that are functioning differently and the content of one capacity also necessitates some kind of division. These and similar questions must be settled in order that we have a clearer picture on the intricacies of Platonic theories of the soul in antiquity. In the early modern period, Platonic problems form part and parcel of the debates concerning the soul. Starting with Pomponazzi’s work on the immortality of the soul, in which he argues for the mortal nature of the human soul, divisibility became to mean spatial divisibility in the first place. Those belonging to the Galenic tradition, following here the Timaeus, argued that we can assign the different faculties of the soul to different parts of the body, whereas others denied such a localizability to the soul’s parts. The former position seems to be omnipresent throughout the seventeenth century in the form of metaphysical and physiological speculations about “material soul”, a term that can be found in Thomas Hobbes, Pierre Gassendi, Margaret Cavendish, and even in the physiological writings of Descartes. The latter position turned into a Cartesian doctrine which denied any spatial extension to the res cogitans. Since this view was suspected of undermining the unity of man, seventeenth-century philosophers invested much time trying to do somehow justice to both accounts. For this reason, it is small wonder that these approaches, in spite of their prima facie antagonism, went hand in hand in seventeenth-century thought. Cambridge Platonists, grappling with the task of overcoming the Cartesian form of dualism (while upholding the immateriality of the soul) were especially influenced by different Platonist traditions. Arguably, the revival of Platonsim in the seventeenth century was due to its impressing array of theoretical positions offering sophisticated alternatives to the Cartesian concept of mind. The subject of inquiry should be to unearth the internal differences in the dualist tradition in 17th century on this aspect of the soul.
Psycho-physical interaction is also a much disputed issue in Platonism. Plato in the Laws distinguishes three kinds of motion: bodily motion, psychic motion, and the motion of intellect. He vehemently argues that psychic motion - which he identifies with self-motion - is causally and in some sense also temporally prior to bodily motions, while he leaves open the question of the status of noetic motion. Later Platonists take for granted that noetic motion enjoys priority over psychic motion in the same way as psychic motion does over bodily motion. We pursue the emergence of this interpretation and argue that Plato's text can be regarded as an important inspiration for the Neoplatonic doctrine of "double activity" which was designed to account for, among other things, the relationship between the soul and the body. Related to this problem, Plato himself asserted in the Phaedrus (245) that the soul moves itself and thus sets the body in motion. The exact mechanism has not been explained clearly here, but the Timaeus may give a more explicit account. It says that the rational part of the soul is a complexity of circular motions and the rectilinear bodily motions are caused by such revolutions. In later Platonism explanation of the interaction was determined by the overall views on the impassibility (apatheia) of the soul. The embodied existence of the soul - an intelligible entity - presents Plotinus with various metaphysical and ethical problems. In this connection, he often invokes Plato's myths about the destiny of the soul after death which he interprets allegorically. He develops an account that does not compromise the ontological priority of soul over body. It is the soul itself that must be responsible for embodiment, because the soul cannot be directly causally determined by the body. We intend to show that Plotinus does not resort to a psychic faculty of decision interpreted in a libertarian fashion in his account of the 'descent' of the soul. Furthermore, if the soul cannot be subjected to bodily influences then there will be a most difficult task to explain, not only the feeling of pain, but also sense-perception, which on the standard account consists in the impact of the external objects onto the senses via bodily organs. It led Plotinus to suggest that sense-perception and memory are a mainly psychic movements, although it might be still unclear how the details of the sensory process is to be explained along these lines. What seems to be clear is that he splits it into a part that affects the operations of the sense organ (to aisthétérion), and another that does not. Later on, inclusion of Aristotelian doctrines aggravated the problem. To mention but one sample, Pseudo-Simplicius was very much concerned about the extent of impassibility of the soul. He discussed Aristotle’s distinction between three kinds of sense-perception (e.g., De anima II 5) with a view to demarcate those aspects that do not involve bodily influences whatsoever. In brief, the operations of the organ are affected in a way appropriate to the animal, though the affection ends up as a formal activity as the sensitive soul recognises the sensible objects by projecting notions while it stands still at its form (CAG XI, 128.25-29). Thus sense-perception is a projection of notions/concepts onto sensible objects. It is quite clear in the case of incidental perception, which means perception of individual things (Diares’ son, in Aristotle’s example), but less obvious in the case of primary sense-objects such as colours and sound, and common sense objects such as size and shape. Reliability of such a kind of perception in general is backed by a metaphysical theory according to which the forms of the sensible things are akin to the notions projected onto them.  The commentator follows Proclus who laid great emphasis on the assessment of sense date by having them translated into mental signals – conceptual representations perhaps – which could be referred to an innate set of criteria derived from the intellect. Philoponus was also concerned about the impassibility of the soul during sense-perception. By the aid of examples he argues that there is some degree of affection in the perception of primary and common sense objects, but it may vary depending on the object. For instance, he claims that we have tactile perception of rest or motion in the waters of a river by standing in it, although the water flowing in it forms a continuum. Perception of rest and motion in this way shows that the sense of touch is subjected to a different affection in each case (CAG XV, 316.11-14). Along with complete works of Plato and Aristotle the texts of the commentators were available in the 16th century in Latin translation as well. This fact may explain that the arousal of problem of impassibility lurks behind many issues concerning psycho-physical interaction. Traditional worries were reinforced in the early modern age by the problem of causality between finite beings in general or the mind and the body in particular. As is well known, Descartes tried to explain the causal interaction by pointing to the pineal gland where it supposedly takes place. It is also well known that the explanation has not been accepted unanimously, to say the least. We have to inquire into the details of the dispute with such an intellectual background in mind.

Selected Bibliography

Alanen, Lilli, Descartes’ Concept of Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2003.
Almog, Joseph, What Am I? Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford: OUP, 2002.
Benz, Hubert, “Materie” und Wahrnehmung in der Philosophie Plotins. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1990.
Blumenthal, Henry, Plotinus’ Psychology. Hága: M. Nijhoff, 1971.
Blumenthal, Henry, Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. London: Duckworth, 1996.
Chiaradonna, Riccardo (szerk.), Studi sull’ anima in Plotino. Nápoly, Bibliopolis, 2005.
Cottingham, John, “The intellect, the will, and the passions: Spinoza’s critique of Descartes”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 26(1988), 239-257.
Cottingham, John (szerk.), Reason, Will and Sensation. Studies in Descartes’ Metaphysics. Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1994.
Des Chene, Dennis, Life’s Form. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2000.
Emilsson, Eyjólfur, Kjalar, Plotinus on Sense-Perception. Cambridge: CUP, 1988.
Emilsson, Eyjólfur, Kjalar, Plotinus on Intellect. Oxford, 2007.
Gouhier, Henry, Cartésianisme et augustinisme au xvii siècle. Párizs: J. Vrin, 1978.
Menn, Stephen, Descartes and Augustine. Cambridge: CUP, 1998.
Perkams, Matthias, Selbstbewusstsein in der Spätantike. Berlin & New York: W. de Gruyter, 2008.
Perler, Dominik (szerk.), Ancient and Medieval Theories  of Intentionality. Berlin & New York: W. de Gruyter, 2001.
Perler, Dominik - Wild, Markus (szerk.), Sehen und Begreifen. Wahrnehmungstheorien in der frühen Neuzeit, Berlin & New York: W. de Gruyter, 2008.
Perler, Dominik (szerk.), Transformations of the Soul. Aristotelian Psychology 1250-1650, special issue of Vivarium 46,3(2008).
Remes, Pauliina, Plotinus on Self. The Philosophy of „We”. Cambridge: CUP, 2007.
Rozemond, Marleen, Descartes’ Dualism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1998.
Sorabji, Richard, „From Aristotle to Brentano. The development of the concept of intentionality”, Blumenthal, H.J., Robinson, H. (szerk.), Aristotle and the Later Tradition. OSAP Suppl. 1991, 227-259.
Sorabji, Richard, Self. Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death. Oxford: OUP, 2006.
Steel, Carlos, The Changing Self. Brüsszel: Paleis der Acadëmien, 1978.
Taormina, Daniela, Patrizia (szerk.), L’essere del pensiero. Saggi sulla filosofia di Plotino. Nápoly: Bibliopolis, 2010
Watson, Richard, The Downfall of Cartesianism. 1673-1712: A Study of Epistemological Issues in Late Seventeenth Century Cartesianism. Hága: M. Nijhoff, 1966.